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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Third countries may be associated to the EU through the conclusion of association agreements foreseen 
in Article 217 TFEU. However, the meaning of such an ‘association’ is rather elusive.  
This study shows how association agreements are broad and comprehensive agreements which have 
evolved over time, in line with the evolution of (internal) EU integration itself. From a material point of 
view, association agreements typically contain three main components: political dialogue, trade 
liberalisation and sectoral cooperation. Whereas such areas may also be covered in other types of 
agreements, association agreements generally include more far-reaching commitments in terms of trade 
integration and legislative approximation. They are considered to be the most ambitious and most far-
reaching types of agreements concluded with third countries in a particular geographical area and, 
therefore, introduce a certain level of differentiation in the EU’s relations with third countries.  
Association agreements establish a long-term legal and institutional framework for cooperation. The 
establishment of joint institutions with decision-making capacities allows for the dynamic development 
of the association. ‘Association’ is therefore to be conceived of as a process rather than as an end in itself.  
Different types of association agreements, and thus ‘association’, may be identified. Broadly speaking, 
there is association as a pre-accession status, association as an alternative to membership and association 
as a privileged status of non-European countries. Notwithstanding the general flexibility regarding the 
precise scope and objectives of the established relationship, there are also certain limits to what is feasible 
under the association formula. In particular, the procedural and institutional rights of the associated 
countries are limited to decision-shaping and cannot involve any rights of representation or decision-
making within the EU Institutions.     
The association formula may also be used for defining the post-Brexit relations with the United Kingdom. 
In fact, the political declaration setting out the framework for the future EU-UK relationship explicitly 
provides that the overarching institutional framework could take the form of an association agreement. 
From a pragmatic point of view, this would help avoiding potentially complex discussions regarding the 
choice of the correct legal basis for the new legal arrangement.  
In addition, the experience of the EU’s bilateral relations with Switzerland illustrates the importance of a 
well-designed institutional structure in order to guarantee legal certainty for citizens and businesses. 
Moreover, the establishment of joint bodies with decision-making powers allows for the dynamic 
development of the future relationship.  
The inherent flexibility of ‘association’ as a legal concept also means that the actual format of the new 
relations is not pre-defined. This may either be a comprehensive framework agreement, such as the 
association agreements with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, or a more focused agreement on market 
integration, such as the EEA agreement.  
Finally, it is noteworthy that the European Parliament’s role in the process leading to the conclusion of 
association agreements is not to be underestimated. From a formal perspective, the Parliament only has 
to give its consent at the end of the procedure but a dynamic application of its right to be immediately 
informed at all stages of the procedure, guaranteed under Article 218 (10) TFEU, provides significant 
opportunities to influence the content of international agreements. The Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA) 
between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on Better Law-making may be be 
used to clarify the role of the Parliament with respect to issues such as access to the negotiation 
guidelines, decisions on provisional application and monitoring of the implementation and potential 
suspension of agreements.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Association agreements (AAs) between the European Union (EU) and third countries are one of the most 
important and traditional tools of the EU’s external policy. Already in the Treaty of Rome of 1957, it was 
foreseen that the European Economic Community (EEC) “may conclude with a third state, a union of 
states or an international organisation agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights 
and obligations, common action and special procedures”.1 Apart from certain procedural amendments, 
involving inter alia a greater role for the European Parliament, this provision has never been substantially 
amended and is now to be found in Article 217 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). The Treaty of Lisbon further introduced a specific provision (Article 8 TEU) for the development of 
a ‘special relationship’ with neighbouring countries, raising questions about its significance for the 
practice of association.  
 
In the history of the European integration process, association agreements have been concluded with a 
wide variety of third countries, in Europe and beyond.2 It is noteworthy that the evolution of the EU’s 
association practice is not linear. Association agreements come and go in waves and are frequently used 
as policy instruments vis-à-vis particular regions and (groups of) countries. Although all association 
agreements differ in terms of their exact content and objectives, the common denominator is the 
ambition to establish a legal and institutional framework for the development of privileged relations 
involving close political and economic cooperation.  
 
Defining the precise meaning of association is a challenging task. The relevant treaty provision (Article 
217 TFEU) is rather vague and the proliferation of different types of association agreements in practice 
means that it is almost impossible to arrive at a precise definition. However, based upon an analysis of 
the law and practice of association, the aim of this study is to identify a number of key features 
characterising the nature of association under EU law.  
  
                                                          
 
1 Article 238 of the EEC Treaty.  
2 For an overview, see Chapter 4 of this study. 
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1. THE TREATY FRAMEWORK  
 KEY FINDINGS  
• Article 217 TFEU is the main legal basis allowing third countries to be associated with the 
EU.  
• Article 8 TEU, introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon, may be seen as an essentially political 
provision which does not affect the legal nature of association under Article 217 TFEU. 
• Article 217 TFEU is a very flexible legal basis allowing for a variety of privileged relations 
with third partners. 
• Association under Article 217 TFEU differs from EU membership in the sense that the 
associated country cannot be granted decision-making powers within the EU institutions. 
  
Under general international law it is not entirely uncommon for international organisations to allow for 
different forms of membership. Indeed, some international organisations allow for ‘associate 
membership’, which may be defined as “membership with limited rights, possibly leading to full membership 
at a later date.”3 Although the original EEC Treaty dealt with enlargement and association in two 
subsequent Articles (237 and 238 EEC), the association of third states (and international organisations) 
foreseen in the current Article 217 TFEU is not to be confused with associate membership as a form of 
observer status known under international law. In fact, under EU law, third countries and international 
organisations cannot acquire an institutionalised status as observer.4 Put differently, association 
(pursuant to Article 217 TFEU) remains ‘external’, internal association (i.e. observer or associate 
membership status) is not foreseen in EU law.5 The precise meaning of the EU notion of association will 
then first be explored by looking at the Treaty framework.  
1.1. Article 217 TFEU 
 
The legal basis for the conclusion of association agreements can be found in Article 217 TFEU. In terms of 
procedure, Article 217 TFEU does not contain any indication on how to conclude an association 
agreement. Instead, association agreements are a special case under Article 218 TFEU, which provides 
that such agreements are to be concluded following a unanimous vote in the Council (Article 218(8) 
TFEU) and with the consent of the European Parliament (Article 218(6)(a)(i) TFEU).  
  
                                                          
 
3 J. Klabbers, An Introduction to International Organizations Law, Cambridge, CUP, 2015, p. 96. 
4 See T. Garcia, Les observateurs auprès des organisations intergouvernementales, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2012, p. 126. 
5 D. Hanf and P. Dengler, ‘Les accords d’association’, in: J.-V. Louis and M. Dony (eds), Commentaire Megret: Relations Extérieures, 
Bruxelles, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2005, p. 296. 
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Article 217 TFEU 
The Union may conclude with one or more third countries or international organisations agreements 
establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special 
procedure. 
 
According to the Court of Justice in the Demirel case (relating to the association agreement with Turkey), 
an agreement concluded on the basis of Article 217 TFEU creates “special, privileged links with a non-
member country,” allowing the third country concerned to “take part in the [Union] system.”6 Association 
is, in other words, a privileged relation under public international law and should be distinguished from 
the association of overseas countries and territories foreseen in Part 4 of the TFEU.7  
While international agreements generally create reciprocal rights and obligations,8 the defining aspect of 
an association agreement is the reference to ‘common action and special procedure’ which in practice 
means that the agreement will establish joint institutions with a competence to adopt binding decisions. 
These decisions form an integral part of the EU legal system.9 This allows for a deepening of the 
association beyond the original content of the agreement itself (but evidently within this framework).10 
Although the EU’s more recent treaty practice shows that ‘mere’ cooperation or trade agreements may 
also establish common institutions, these are generally not empowered to take decisions binding on the 
parties.11 
While Article 217 TFEU is not explicit on the possible scope and depth of the privileged relation 
established by an association agreement, the Court (again in Demirel) noted that Article 217 TFEU 
empowers the Union “to guarantee commitments towards non-member countries in all the fields 
covered by the Treat[ies].”12 As a result, the Court draws a parallel between the EU’s internal scope of 
action and the relation it may set up with an associated country or international organisation. This implies 
that the instrument of association can develop in line with the evolution of EU integration itself and with 
the international context in which the EU operates.13  
 
The privileged relationship established on the basis of an association agreement may take several forms, 
ranging from little more than a free trade agreement to a level of integration that comes close to 
membership.14 Article 217 TFEU is, in other words, a very flexible instrument allowing for a variety of ties 
with states interested in a formal relationship with the EU. The actual scope of the association depends 
on the outcome of the negotiations.  
                                                          
 
6 See Case 12/86, Demirel, ECLI:EU:C:1987:400, para. 9. 
7 See K. Schmalenbach, ‘Art. 217 (ex-Art. 310 EGV) [Assoziierungsabkommen]’, in: Callies and Ruffert, EUV/AEUV, München, Beck, 
2016, § 1; S. Vöneky and B. Beylage-Haarmann, ‘AEUV Art. 217 Assoziierungsabkommen’, in: Grabitz, Hilf and Nettesheim, Das 
Recht der Europäischen Union, 56. EL 2015, § 3. 
8 The reference to ‘reciprocal rights and obligations’ does not require that there should be ‘equality’ in the obligations between 
the parties. An association can involve an imbalance of obligations, for instance in respect to development countries. See M. 
Maresceau, ‘Bilateral Agreements Concluded by the European Community’, Hague Academy of International Law, Recueil des cours 
309 (2004), p. 316.  
9 See Case 30/88, Greece v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1989:422, para. 13. 
10 See K. Schmalenbach, op.cit. note 7, § 4. 
11 S. Vöneky and B. Beylage-Haarmann, op. cit. note 7, § 10. However, there are also exceptions to this rule. For instance, the joint 
institutions established under the CEPA between the EU and Armenia do have decision-making powers.  
12 See Case 12/86, Demirel, ECLI:EU:C:1987:400, para. 9. See also Case C-81/13, UK v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2449, para. 61. 
13 D. Hanf and P. Dengler, op. cit. note 5, p. 294. 
14 Walter Hallstein, former Commission president, declared that ‘association can be anything between full membership minus 1% 
and a trade and co-operation agreement plus 1%’. Cited in: D. Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU 
Membership?, Sheffield, Sheffield Academic Press, 1999, p. 23. 
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Of course, this flexibility also has its limits. On the one hand, a mere cooperation or trade agreement 
cannot be based on Article 217 TFEU.15 On the other hand, the equation of third countries to EU Member 
States through an association is limited to equal treatment in terms of substantive law but does not grant 
a third country the right to participate in EU decision-making. The privileged relation, while allowing the 
third country to take part in the Union system, differs from EU membership in the sense that the 
associated country cannot be granted decision-making powers within the EU institutions.16   
1.2. Article 8 TEU 
 
The Lisbon Treaty introduced a new legal basis for developing the EU’s relations with its neighbouring 
countries. The first proposals regarding a specific ‘neighbourhood clause’ were launched within the 
European Convention during the preparation of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
and coincided with the emerging European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Despite this connotation with 
the ENP, neighbouring countries outside of the ENP have not been excluded from its geographical scope 
of application.17  
  
Article 8 TEU 
1. The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to 
establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the 
Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.  
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the Union may conclude specific agreements with 
the countries concerned. These agreements may contain reciprocal rights and 
obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking activities jointly. Their 
implementation shall be the subject of periodic consultation. 
 
Article 8 TEU does not formally belong to the treaty provisions on EU external action but is part of the so-
called ‘common provisions’ of the TEU including the Union’s foundational values, basic objectives and 
fundamental principles. This position within the structure of the treaties reveals the importance 
attributed to the EU’s neighbourhood relations but, at the same time, the actual implications of this 
vaguely formulated provision are far from clear.18  In particular, the striking similarities between the 
wording of Article 8 (2) TEU and Article 217 TFEU raise questions about the relationship between both 
clauses.   
 
One possible approach is to regard the introduction of Article 8 (2) TEU as a reaction to the increase in 
classical association agreements in the past decades. From this perspective, the purpose of Article 8 (2) 
                                                          
 
15 See S. Vöneky, B. Beylage-Haarmann, op. cit note 7, § 13-14. 
16 See K Schmalenbach, op. cit note 7, § 7. Exceptionally, third countries may exercise voting rights on the governing bodies of EU 
agencies but this is not necessarily based on Article 217 TFEU. See e.g. Arrangement between the European Community and the 
Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway on the modalities of the participation by those States in the European Agency 
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ, 2007 
L 188/17. 
17 P. Van Elsuwege, and R. Petrov, ‘Towards a New Generation of Agreements with the Neighbouring Countries of the European 
Union? Scope, Objectives and Potential Application of Article 8 TEU’, European Law Review 36(5), 2011, pp. 688-703.  
18 C. Hillion, ‘Anatomy of EU norm export towards the neighbourhood: the impact of Article 8 TEU’ in: P. Van Elsuwege and R. 
Petrov (eds.), Legislative approximation and application of EU law in the Eastern neighbourhood of the European Union: Towards a 
common regulatory space?, Oxon, Routledge, 2014, pp. 13-20.  
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TEU is to create a lex specialis to Article 217 TFEU allowing for a specific form of association, reserved for 
the Union’s neighbours and underlining the specific importance of the EU’s neighbourhood relations.19  
 
Article 8 (2) TEU may also be regarded as a potential alternative to formal association. The latter has 
important political connotations. For instance, association agreements with European countries are often 
perceived as a (potential) stepping-stone to EU membership based upon their partial integration in the 
EU legal framework.20 The references to ‘good neighbourliness’ and ‘peaceful relations based on 
cooperation’ in Article 8 TEU reveal that the objectives of agreements concluded under this legal basis 
are unrelated to the prospect of accession. This understanding follows from the genesis of Article 8 TEU 
against the background of the unfolding ENP and the suggestion made in the initial ENP policy 
documents to offer a new type of ‘Neighbourhood Agreements’ within this framework.21 However, this 
notion quickly disappeared from the official discourse, particularly because the ENP countries were not 
interested in such a formula. Ukraine, in particular, strongly opposed any reference to the term 
‘neighbourhood’ or ‘neighbouring country’ during the negotiations of a new framework agreement with 
the EU. After an initial period of uncertainty, with references to the conclusion of an ‘enhanced 
agreement’, it soon became clear that a traditional association agreement on the basis of Article 217 TFEU 
was the preferred option. It is noteworthy, in this respect, that Article 8 (2) TEU did not play a role in the 
conclusion of the association agreements with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, nor in relation to the less-
far reaching Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Armenia.22  
 
A third alternative interpretation is that Article 8 (2) TEU cannot be used as an autonomous substantive 
legal basis. Its general wording and unusual location under Title I on ‘common provisions’ of the TEU as 
well as the absence of specific procedural guidelines under Article 218 TFEU point in this direction.23 As a 
result, Article 8 TEU may be seen as an essentially political provision that does not affect the legal practice 
of the EU’s external action.24 Of course, a reference to Article 8 (2) TEU may be added to the substantive 
legal basis of an association agreement in order to clarify its specific nature and objectives of ‘good 
neighbourliness’. However, from a legal perspective, the added value of such a reference is not very clear 
because this type of privileged relations can be perfectly established under Article 217 TFEU alone.  
 
Finally, it is noteworthy that a Declaration on Article 8 TEU, adopted as an annex to the Intergovernmental 
Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, provides that “the Union will take into account the 
particular situation of small-sized countries which maintain specific relations of proximity with it.”25 This 
declaration formed the basis for a revision of the EU’s relations with Andorra, Monaco and San Marino 
leading to negotiations on one or several association agreement(s) with these countries in 2015. 
Significantly, the Council decision authorising the opening of the negotiations only refers to Article 217 
TFEU as the substantive legal basis whereas a reference to Article 8 TEU is included in the preamble to the 
                                                          
 
19 D. Hanf, ‘The ENP in the light of the new neighbourhood clause’, in: E. Lannon (ed.), Challenges of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, Brussels-Berlin: Peter Lang Publishers, 2011, p. 211. 
20 D. Phinnemore, op. cit. note 14.  
21 P. Van Elsuwege and R. Petrov, op. cit. note 17, p. 693. 
22 Cadilhac and Rapoport deplore the fact that Article 8 TEU was not used to conclude the CEPA with Armenia, see M.-C. Cadilhac 
and C. Rapoport, ‘Chronique Action extérieure de l'Union européenne - L'accord de partenariat global et renforcé UE-Arménie: 
une quasi-association qui tait son nom’, Revue Trimestrielle de droit Européen, 2018, 1, pp. 211-213. 
23 See on this discussion: Van Elsuwege and Petrov op. cit. note 17, p. 697.  
24 S. Blockmans, ‘Friend or Foe? Reviewing EU Relations with its Neighbours Post-Lisbon’, in Koutrakos, P. (ed.) The European 
Union’s External Relations a Year after Lisbon, CLEER Working Papers 2011/13, p. 116.  
25 Declaration No 3 on Article 8 of the Treaty on European Union, OJ (2012) C 326/339. 
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14 
decision.26 This confirms the practice that Article 8 TEU is not used as a separate legal basis in itself but 
rather as an essentially political provision defining the general framework of the EU’s neighbourhood 
relations.  
  
 
 
  
 
  
                                                          
 
26 Council of the EU, Decision authorising the opening of negotiations on one or several association agreement(s) between the 
European Union and the Principality of Andorra, the Principality of Monaco the Republic of San Marino, doc. 10345/14, 4 
December 2014. 
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2. ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS IN PRACTICE: INSTITUTIONAL AND 
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 
 KEY FINDINGS  
• Article 217 TFEU is in itself sufficient to cover a wide variety of substantive areas without requiring 
the addition of other substantive legal bases.  
• Despite the broad scope of Article 217 TFEU, almost all association agreements are concluded in 
the form of ‘mixed agreements’, which implies that in addition to the EU the EU Member States 
are involved as parties in their own right. 
• The choice for mixity is essentially political in nature but raises questions in light of the EU’s 
institutional balance and the principle of conferral. 
• Association agreements establish a legal and institutional framework for cooperation. The 
implementation of the commitments and the elaboration of the association are left for the joint 
institutions set up under the agreement, which can adopt binding decisions that may have direct 
effect. 
• The legal consequences attributed to the provisions in association agreements that are similar or 
identical to provisions to be found in the EU Treaties depend on the aim and context of the 
agreement in comparison to the aim and context of the EU Treaty.  
2.1. The choice of legal basis  
 
Whereas it is perfectly possible to indicate the intention of concluding an association agreement at the 
very start of the procedure, the formal decision concerning the use of Article 217 TFEU as the substantive 
legal basis for the conclusion of an international agreement is a purely internal EU matter which is, in 
principle, not subject to negotiations with the third party.27 The legal basis is decided after the end of the 
negotiations and is solely reflected in the Council’s decision to conclude an agreement. This explains why 
certain agreements are legally based on Article 217 TFEU without having a reference to association in the 
title or text of the agreement.28 The opposite is also possible.29  
In line with the well-established case law of the Court of Justice, the choice of the legal basis for an EU 
measure must be based on “objective factors amenable to judicial review, which include the aim and 
content of that measure”.30 In a situation where a measure pursues several objectives or includes multiple 
                                                          
 
27 M. Maresceau, ‘Bilateral Agreements Concluded by the European Community’, Hague Academy of International Law, Recueil des 
cours 309 (2004), p. 155.  
28 Examples are the Bilaterals I package of seven bilateral agreements with Switzerland and the Trade, Development and 
Cooperation Agreement with South Africa, see further in Chapter 4 of this study.   
29 Reference can be made to the Interim Association Agreement concluded with the Palestinian Liberalisation Organisation (PLO), 
which is legally based on the treaty provisions related to common commercial policy and development co-operation or the 
agreements relating to the association of Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein with the implementation, application 
and development of the Schengen acquis, which all have a more specific substantive legal basis, i.e the protocol integrating the 
Schengen acquis into the framework of the EU for Norway and Iceland (due to the pre-existing Nordic Passport Union) and a 
combination of legal bases (ex Arts 62, 63, 66, 95 EC Treaty and ex 24, 38 EU Treaty) as far as Switzerland is concerned and Arts. 
16, 79(2)(c), 82(1)(b) and (d), 87(3), 89, 114 TFEU with respect to Liechtenstein.   
30 See e.g. Case C-244/17, Commission v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2018:662, para. 36.   
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16 
components, the predominant purpose or component defines the single legal basis. Exceptionally, when 
the various objectives or components are inextricably linked without one being incidental to the other, 
the measure must be founded on the corresponding legal bases.31 
Due to its broad scope and general nature, Article 217 TFEU is in itself sufficient to cover a wide variety of 
substantive areas without requiring additional substantive legal bases.32 Two remarks nonetheless need 
to be made in light of recent institutional practice. First, a number of post-Lisbon association agreements 
have been based on both Article 217 TFEU and Article 37 TEU33 to reflect the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) component of those agreements.34 From a procedural point of view, the presence 
of a CFSP legal basis does not make a major difference because association agreements already require 
unanimity in the Council.35 Moreover, the CFSP dimension of association agreements is in general too 
limited to overrule Article 218(6)a(i) TFEU, which requires the consent of the European Parliament for the 
conclusion of association agreements.36 Nevertheless, the combination of CFSP/TFEU legal bases may be 
regarded as a consequence of the continuing bipolarity of the EU’s external action as reflected in Article 
40 TEU.37 However, in its recent case law, the Court of Justice raised some doubt about this practice when 
it suggested that where the CFSP component of a horizontal agreement is merely ancillary to the 
agreement’s main component, the agreement cannot be based on a TEU legal basis.38 This would mean 
that future association agreements (which typically contain a CFSP component) must be signed and 
concluded pursuant to the single substantive legal basis of Article 217 TFEU. 
Second, in relation to the EU-Ukraine association agreement, the Council has taken a remarkable 
approach by concluding the agreement on the basis of separate decisions.39 Despite the Commission’s 
proposal for a single decision on the basis of Article 217 TFEU, the Council opted to ‘split off’ the provisions 
relating to the treatment of third-country nationals legally employed as workers in the territory of the 
parties (Article 17 of the EU-Ukraine AA). The latter formed the subject of a separate Council Decision 
adopted on the basis of Article 79(2)(b) TFEU.40 The main reason for this complexity is the specific status 
                                                          
 
31 In accordance with established jurisprudence of the Court, a single legal basis should be relied upon where possible. For an 
articulation of this rule, see e.g. Case C-94/03, Commission v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2006:2, paras 35-36.  
32 Maresceau, op. cit. note 27, p. 168.  
33 Article 37 TEU of Chapter 2 “Specific provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy” provides that “The Union may 
conclude agreements with one or more States or international organisations in areas covered by this Chapter.”. 
34 See the agreements with Kosovo, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, etc. See also Frederik Naert, The Use of the CFSP Legal Basis for 
EU International Agreements in Combination with Other Legal Bases, in: Jenő Czuczai and Frederik Naert (eds) The EU as a Global 
Actor - Bridging Legal Theory and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2017, pp. 394-423. 
35 Article 218 (8) TFEU. 
36 According to Article 218(6) TFEU an association agreement can only be concluded without the consent of the European 
Parliament if it relates “exclusively” to CFSP. In Case C-658/11, Commission v. Council, the Court of Justice clarified that the 
substantive legal basis of a Council decision adopted for the conclusion of an international agreement determines the procedures 
to be followed. Hence, the Parliament does not play a role in this process only when the substantive legal basis exclusively relates 
to the area of CFSP.   
37 See A. Dashwood, ‘The continuing bipolarity of EU external action’, in: I. Govaere, E. Lannon, P. Van Elsuwege, S. Adam (eds.), 
The European Union in the World. Essays in Honour of Marc Maresceau, Boston-Leiden, Brill-Martinus Nijhoff,  2014) pp. 3-16 and, in 
the same volume, S. Adam, ‘The Legal Basis of International Agreements of the European Union in the Post-Lisbon Era’, pp. 65-
86.  
38 See Case C-244/17, Commission v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2018:662. In this case, the Court was not asked to rule on the validity of the 
Council decision concluding the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) with Kazakhstan but only on the 
Council decision determining the position to be adopted in the body set up by this agreement. However, there do not seem to 
be any reasons why the Court’s reasoning could not be transposed to the Council decisions on concluding and signing 
agreements.  
39 It is noteworthy that the same issue did not arise in relation to the association agreements with Moldova and Georgia because 
the latter agreements do not include clause similar to Article 17 of the EU-Ukraine AA.  
40 Council Decision 2017/1248 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Association Agreement between the 
European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other 
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of the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland in respect of the EU competences in the Area of Freedom 
Security and Justice (AFSJ). Pursuant to Protocol 21 to the Treaty of Lisbon, both countries have 
the discretionary power to decide whether or not they want to take part in the adoption of legislative acts 
under this title.41 Taking into account that Article 17 of the EU-Ukraine AA falls within the scope of the 
AFSJ, in particular Article 79(2)(b) TFEU on the rights of third-country nationals residing legally in the EU 
Member States, a separate Council Decision was deemend necessary. Nevertheless, this option is not 
undisputable. The provision on the equal treatment of workers is an integral part of the established 
association and it seems far-fetched to argue that the aim and content of this provision is distinct from 
and independent of the aim and content of the other provisions of the association agreement. Arguably, 
the approach developed by the Council ignores the essence of the association agreement as a 
comprehensive framework for the establishment of privileged relations.42  
2.2. The role of the European Parliament 
 
Pursuant to Article 218 (6) (a) (i) TFEU, the conclusion of association agreements requires the consent of 
the European Parliament. Although withholding consent is not a mere theoretic possibility,43 it is far from 
evident for the European Parliament to do so without risking negative fallout for the credibility of the EU 
as an international actor. However, the European Parliament’s influence in the procedure for the 
conclusion of international agreements is not limited to the possibility of withholding consent after the 
end of the negotiations. Of particular significance is the duty, laid down in Article 218 (10) TFEU, to keep 
the European Parliament “immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure”.  This is an 
essential procedural requirement which is of general application to all types of international agreements, 
including agreements relating exclusively to the CFSP.44 As observed by the Court of Justice, “the 
information requirement arising under Article 218(10) TFEU is prescribed in order to ensure that the 
Parliament is in a position to exercise democratic scrutiny of the European Union’s external action and, 
more particularly, to verify that its powers are respected specifically as a result of the choice of legal basis 
for a decision on the conclusion of an agreement.”45  
Significantly, Article 218 (10) TFEU does not imply that the Parliament should remain passive until it is 
informed by the Commission and the Council. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the Rules of Procedure 
of the European Parliament provide ample opportunities to influence the process leading to the 
conclusion of international agreements. Under Rule 52, the Parliament’s Committees can draw up own-
initiative reports and submit them to the plenary for adoption.46 Rule 123(2) provides for the possibility 
                                                          
 
part, as regards the provisions relating to the treatment of third-country nationals legally employed as workers in the territory of 
the other party, OJ 2017 L 181/4. 
41 Protocol (No 21) on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice, OJ 
2010 C 83/295. 
42 M.-C. Cadilhac and C. Rapoport, ‘Chronique Action extérieure de l'Union européenne - Conclusion de l'accord d'association UE-
Ukraine : le Conseil voit double !’, Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen, 2018, pp. 213-214. 
43 In the past, the European Parliament decided to withhold its consent of the Swift agreement with the United States, the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and the Second Protocol to the Fisheries Agreement with Morocco. See: R. Passos, ‘The 
External Powers of the European Parliament’, in: P. Eeckhout and M. Lopez-Escudero, The European Union’s External Action in Times 
of Crisis, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2016, pp. 88-100.   
44 Case C-658/11, European Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2014:2025, paras 80-85. See for comments: P. Van Elsuwege, ‘Securing the 
Institutional Balance in the Procedure for Concluding International Agreements: European Parliament v. Council (Pirate Transfer 
Agreement with Mauritius), Common Market Law Review (2015) 1379-1398.  
45 Case C-658/11, European Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2014:2025, para 79 and Case C-263/14, European Parliament v. Council, 
EU:C:2016:435, para. 80.  
46 Relevant examples of such resolutions include the European Parliament resolution of 5 February 2009 on the development 
impact of Economic Partnership Agreements; European Parliament resolution of 13 March 2018 on gender equality in EU trade 
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to  wind up a debate, on the basis of a resolution, following a statement made by the (European) Council 
or Commission.47 This may be tabled by a committee, a political group or MEPs reaching at least the low 
threshold of one twentieth of Parliament’s component members. In addition, under Rule 133 even 
individual MEPs may table motions for resolutions. Of course, there has to be an internal decision on the 
message the Parliament wants to convey to the other institutions. As the least ‘monolithic’ of the 
institutions finding such an internal agreement is not self-evident. The currently pending Opinion 
procedure 1/17 before the Court of Justice is a case in point. Formally, the Parliament is on an equal 
footing with the Commission, Council and the Member States when it comes to the submission of 
observations to the Court. However, before such observations can be lodged, Parliament will have to 
internally agree on a position.48 Despite (or because of?) the significant political relevance of Opinion 1/17 
such an internal agreement could not be mustered, with the result that the Parliament was conspicuously 
absent in the proceedings before the Court.  
In addition to the opportunities provided under the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, the Framework 
Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission49 grants 
important rights to the Parliament, such as immediate access to the Commission’s draft negotiating 
directives, inclusion of MEPs in Union delegations, etc.50 In addition, the Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA) 
between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on Better Law-making of April 2016, 
concluded on the basis of Article 295 TFEU, provides that each institution can exercise its rights and fulfil 
its obligations regarding the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements, as interpreted by 
the Court of Justice. Moreover, there is a commitment to negotiate improved practical arrangements for 
cooperation and information-sharing. This would allow to clarify certain issues regarding the 
involvement of the European Parliament in the procedure for concluding international agreements, 
including inter alia possibilities to express its views before the opening of negotiations, the decision on 
the provisional application of mixed agreements (see infra) or the implementation and potential 
suspension of agreements.51 Hence, the role of the Parliament is in practice more sophisticated than what 
a cursory reading of Article 218 TFEU suggests.     
2.3. The practice of mixity and its implications 
 
Almost all association agreements are concluded in the form of ‘mixed agreements’, which implies that 
in addition to the EU the EU Member States are involved as parties in their own right.52 This so-called 
                                                          
 
agreements; European Parliament resolution of 16 January 2019 on the implementation of the Trade Pillar of the Association 
Agreement with Central America; etc. 
47 Relevant examples of such resolutions include European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2015 on relations between the EU 
and the League of Arab States and cooperation in countering terrorism; European Parliament resolution of 13 June 2013 on the 
negotiations on an EU-Afghanistan cooperation agreement on partnership and development; European Parliament resolution of 
17 January 2013 on the EU-Iraq Partnership and Cooperation Agreement; European Parliament resolution of 13 June 2012 on the 
negotiations on the UN Arms Trade Treaty; etc. 
48 See Rule 141 of the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure. 
49 See OJ 2010 L 304/47. Article 295 TFEU now provides that inter-institutional agreements may be binding. Pre-Lisbon, the Court 
already enforced the provisions of an interinstitutional agreement in Case C-25/94, Commission v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:1996:114. 
50 For a discussion, see Andrea Ott, The European Parliament’s Role in EU Treaty-Making, (2016) 23 Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law 6, pp. 1017-1019. 
51 Passos, op cit. supra note 43, pp. 127-128.  
52 In the past, only the association agreements with Malta and Cyprus were not mixed, due to their almost exclusive focus on the 
establishment of a customs union. Today, the only exception is the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo, which 
has been concluded as an EU-only agreement due to the non-recognition of the independence of Kosovo by five EU Member 
States. See: P. Van Elsuwege, ‘Legal Creativity in EU External Relations: The Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the 
EU and Kosovo’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 2017, pp. 393-410.  
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practice of mixity is somewhat paradoxical taking into account that Article 217 TFEU allows agreements 
to be concluded by the EU alone with a scope as broad as that of the EU Treaties themselves.53 Moreover, 
Member States already have veto power since unanimity in the Council is needed for the conclusion of 
association agreements. Nevertheless, association agreements tend to be mixed for a number of reasons. 
First, they are typically comprehensive in nature, providing a general framework for cooperation 
involving areas belonging to EU and Member State competences. Second, mixity is often a pragmatic 
solution to avoid internal competence battles among EU institutions and Member States. Third, the 
political importance of association agreements explains why Member States prefer to be a contracting 
party in their own right, in addition to the EU. It not only endows them with additional bargaining power 
during the negotiations and in the ratification process but also upholds their visibility vis-à-vis third 
countries.54 Hence, the choice for mixity is not necessarily a result of legal orthodoxy but frequently the 
consequence of crude political interests on behalf of the Member States.    
Before mixed agreements enter into force they need to be ratified by all the parties, thus including all the 
EU Member States. Accordingly, mixed agreements create a kind of ‘additional reinforced unanimity’.55 
Non-ratification by one Member State is sufficient to block the entry into force of the entire agreement 
and this seriously affects the Union, as a whole, as well as the Member States that have already ratified.56 
Moreover, the entire ratification process of mixed agreements can take several years. In anticipation of 
the finalisation of this procedure, the Council therefore adopts a decision regarding the provisional 
application of certain parts of the agreement. The scope of the provisional application can be as broad as 
the EU’s own competences. This decision on provisional application is usually adopted simultaneously 
with the Council decision upon signature of the agreement.  
In terms of decision-making this is significant since the Council can decide autonomously on the 
provisional application of an association agreement without the consent of the European Parliament, 
whereas the Parliament’s consent is required for the formal conclusion of the agreement (see supra). In 
political terms, however, the formal option of withholding consent at conclusion stage would be 
practically nullified because the agreement would already have de facto entered into force for years. In 
light of this reality, and to safeguard the prerogatives of the European Parliament, a certain practice has 
developed whereby the Commission only initiates the procedure for provisional application of an 
agreement after having heard the European Parliament.57 However, this practice is not enforceable 
before the Court and has not been consistently adhered to.58 
Since the choice for mixity seems to be essentially political (at least in so far as no exclusive national 
competences are involved), the means to limit mixity would also seem to be political. Thus, the 
Commission and the Parliament may pressure the Council to exhaust the EU’s competences to the fullest. 
                                                          
 
53 See also A. Rosas, ‘Exclusive, shared and national competence in the context of EU external relations; do such distinctions 
matters?’, in I. Govaere, et al. (eds.) The European Union in the World. Essays in Honour of Marc Maresceau, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2014, p. 24; A. Rosas, 'The Future of Mixity', in C. Hillion and P. Koutrakos (eds.), Mixed agreements revisited: the EU 
and its Member States in the world, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010, p. 368. 
54 A. Rosas, ‘The Future of Mixity’, in: C. Hillion and P. Koutrakos (eds.) Mixed Agreements Revisited. The EU and its Member States in 
the World, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010, pp. 367-374.    
55 See: M. Maresceau, ‘A Typology of Mixed Bilateral Agreements’, in: C. Hillion and P. Koutrakos (eds.) Mixed Agreements Revisited. 
The EU and its Member States in the World, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010, p. 19.   
56 See: G. Van der Loo and R. Wessel, ‘The Non-ratification of Mixed Agreements: Legal Consequences and Solutions’, Common 
Market Law Review, 2017, pp. 735-770.  
57 See G. Van der Loo, The EU-Ukraine association agreement and deep and comprehensive free trade area: a new legal instrument for 
EU integration without membership?, Leiden, Brill, 2016, pp. 128-129. This practice goes beyond what the Commission and 
Parliament agreed in para. 7 of Annex III to the 2010 Framework Agreement, see OJ 2010 L 304/47. 
58 See R. Passos, op.cit. supra note 43, pp. 120-123. 
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However, a legal case could also be made against mixity on the basis of two grounds.59 First, the choice 
for a mixed (rather than an EU-only) agreement may upset the EU’s institutional balance.60 Second, it may 
be argued that the option for mixity is not possible when the provisions of an agreement, which fall under 
national competence, are purely ancillary.61 It must be noted however that these two legal limits have 
not yet been tested before the Court of Justice. 
2.4. The implementation (and direct effect) of association agreements  
 
Association agreements are typically broad instruments, providing a framework for further and deeper 
cooperation. The implementation of the commitments and the elaboration of the association are then 
left to the joint institutions set up under the agreement.62 A clear example are the decisions of the EU-
Turkey Association Council regarding the establishment of the customs union and the legal position of 
Turkish workers and their family members in the EU (see infra). Significantly, decisions of the Association 
Council are legally binding and qualify for direct effect in the legal order of EU Member States if they 
contain clear and precise commitments which do not require further implementing measures.63 The 
same conditions for direct effect are applicable to the provisions of association agreements themselves 
and their protocols.64  
 
It is noteworthy that the Council Decisions on the conclusion of the latest generation of association 
agreements with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia all provide that “[t]he Agreement shall not be construed 
as conferring rights or imposing obligations which can be directly invoked before Union or Member State 
courts or tribunals.”65 The question thus arises to what extent such a unilateral declaration, which is not 
part of the agreement itself, precludes the direct effect of the agreement’s clear and unconditional 
provisions.66 This practice, which has not yet been tested before the Court of Justice, may have some 
paradoxical implications in the sense that certain provisions in older and less ambitious agreements do 
qualify for direct effect.67  
                                                          
 
59 On both the options discussed below, see M. Chamon, 'Constitutional Limits to the Political Choice for Mixity', in E. Neframi and 
M. Gatti (eds.), Constitutional Issues of EU External Relations Law, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2018, pp. 137-166. 
60 For earlier suggestions in this vein, see Opinion 1/76 re Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland 
waterway vessels, ECLI:EU:C:1977:63, para. 7; P. Gilsdorf, ‘Die Außenkompetenzen der EG im Wandel – Eine kritische 
Auseinandersetzung mit Praxis und Rechtsprechung’, (Europarecht, 1996, 31(2), p. 161. 
61 On this, see also Opinion of AG Wahl of 8 September 2016, Opinion 3/15, EU:C:2016:657, para. 122; A. Rosas, ‘The European 
Union and Mixed Agreements’, in: A. Dashwood, C. Hillion (eds), The General Law of EC External Relations, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2000, pp. 203-204. Contra applying the ancillary test in these situations, see Council doc. 8305/14 ADD 1, p. 3; Opinion 
of AG Kokott of 31 May 2018, Joined Cases C-626/15 and C-659/16, Commission v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2018:362, para. 82. 
62 See further at section 5.2 of this study for a detailed analysis of the institutional framework established on the basis of 
association agreements. 
63 Case C-192/89, Sevince, EU:C:1990:322. 
64 See e.g. Case 17/81, Pabst & Richarz, EU:C:1982:129; Case C-438/00, Deutscher Handballbund v. Maros Kolpak, EU:C:2003:255; 
Case C-228/06, Soysal et. al., EU:C:2009:101.   
65 See Article 5 of Council Decision 2014/295/EU (OJ 2014 L161/1) and Article 7 of Council Decision 2014/668 (OJ 2014 L278/1). 
Significantly, a specific Council Decision 2014/669 was adopted with respect to the provisions relating to the third country 
nationals legally employed as workers in the territory of the other party. Also in this Council Decision the formula excluding the 
direct applicability of the AA provision is included (both in the preamble and in Article 3) See: OJ 2014 L 278/6. 
66 According to AG Saggio “a unilateral interpretation of the agreement made in the context of an internal adoption procedure 
cannot – outside the system of reservations – limit the effects of the agreement itself”, See: Opinion of the AG in Case C-149/96, 
Portugal v. Council, [1999], ECR I-8395, para. 20. For comments, see also G. Van Der Loo, The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (Brill 2016) p. 197. 
67 For instance, in the Simutenkov case, the Court recognised the direct effect of a provision guaranteeing the non-discrimination 
of legally employed Russian workers in EU Member States (Case C-265/03, Simutenkov v. Real Federacion Española de Fùtbol 
EU:C:2005:213, para. 29). A similarly worded provision is included in Article 17 of the association agreement with Ukraine. It is 
perhaps even more paradoxical that such a clause is not even foreseen in the association agreements with Moldova and Georgia.     
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Significantly, recognition of direct effect does not necessarily mean that identically worded provisions in 
an association agreement and in the EU Treaties are given the same substantive interpretation. According 
to the well-established case law of the Court of Justice, a textual parallel between certain provisions of an 
international agreement and those of the EU Treaties is insufficient to ensure an identical interpretation. 
The legal consequences attributed to the respective provisions depend upon the aim and context of the 
agreement in comparison to the aim and context of the EU Treaty.68 Hence, the conclusion of an 
association agreement does not automatically imply the application of EU law principles and concepts in 
relations with the associated country. This depends upon the specific nature of the commitments and the 
objectives of the established association.69  
 
The objectives of the association also affect the legal basis for the adoption of EU positions within the 
bodies set up under association agreements. In three largely comparable cases initiated by the UK against 
the Council,70 the Court concluded that Article 48 TFEU (regulating the free movement of workers in the 
EU legal order) could be used as the sole legal basis for the adoption of the EU position regarding the 
rules on social security coordination with the EEA countries and Switzerland. In this respect, the Court 
stressed the existence of legal instruments guaranteeing the homogenous interpretation and application 
of the shared legal rules in this particular area.71 With respect to Turkey, however, such mechanisms are 
not provided under the association agreement and, as a result, the EU’s position had to be adopted on 
the combined legal basis of Article 48 TFEU and 217 TFEU. However, since the purpose of the decision 
was not to conclude an association agreement or to supplement or amend the established institutional 
framework, the position could still be adopted by qualified majority rather than unanimously.72  
  
                                                          
 
68 Case 270/80, Polydor v. Harlequin, EU:C:1982:43, para. 15-16. See also Case C-312/91, Metalsa, EU:C:1993:279, para. 11.  
69 See, further in Chapter 4 of this study for a comparison between different types of association and its legal implications. See 
also: C. Tobler, ‘Context-related Interpretation of Association Agreements. The Polydor Principle in a Comparative Perspective: 
EEA Law, Ankara Association Law and Market Access Agreements between Switzerland and the EU’, in: D. Thym and M. Zoeteweij-
Turhan (eds.), Rights of Third-Country Nationals under EU Association Agreements. Degrees of Free Movement and Citizenship, Boston-
Leiden, Brill, 2015, pp. 101-126. 
70 Case C-431/11, UK v. Council (EER), EU:C:2013:589; Case C-656/11, UK v. Council (Switzerland), EU:C:2014:97; Case C-81/13, UK v. 
Council (Turkey), EU:C:2014:2449.  
71 N. Rennuy and P. Van Elsuwege, ‘Integration without membership and the dynamic development of EU law: United Kingdom v. 
Council (EEA)’ CMLRev., 2014, p. 946. 
72 Case C-81/13, UK v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2449. 
Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
22 
3. A TYPOLOGY OF ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS 
 KEY FINDINGS  
• The EU’s association practice is not the result of a pre-determined strategy but rather the 
consequence of a pragmatic approach. 
• The material scope of association agreements coincides with the evolution of the EU’s 
competences. 
• From a legal perspective, the conclusion of an association agreement is disconnected from the 
procedure for accession to the EU. 
 
The concept of ‘association’ has been used in various contexts and for different purposes. Originally, there 
were only two types of association agreements: those preparing a third country for accession to the EU 
and those supporting the development of former colonies of the Member States in the African, Pacific 
and Caribbean (ACP) region.73 In the 1990s this picture changed when Article 217 TFEU was used to 
establish privileged relations with a diverse group of neighbouring countries, which either did not aspire 
for EU membership, such as the EFTA states, or did not qualify for membership at all, such as the countries 
of the Southern Mediterranean. 
 
Moreover, the purpose of association may evolve over time. For instance, the Europe Agreements with 
the CEECs were initiated as an alternative to membership but later became an important vehicle for 
accession following their political reorientation by the 1993 Copenhagen European Council.74 In the more 
recent past, the EU also concluded association agreements with non-European countries in Central and    
Latin America. 
  
                                                          
 
73 M.-A., Gaudissart, ‘Réflexions sur la nature et la portée du concept d’association à la lumière de sa mise en œuvre’, in : M.F. 
Christophe Tchakaloff (ed.), Le concept d’association dans les accords passés par la Communauté : Essai de clarification, Bruxelles, 
Bruylant, 1999, p. 7 et. seq. The development type thereby had to be understood in light of the fact that until the Maastricht 
Treaty, the EU did not have an explicit development cooperation competence. See M. Cremona, ‘The Principle of Conferral and 
Express and Implied External Competences’, in: E. Neframi and M. Gatti (eds), Constitutional Issues of EU External Relations Law, 
Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1998, p. 48. 
74 K. Inglis, ‘The Europe Agreements compared in light of their pre-accession orientation’, CMLRev. 2000, pp. 1173-1210.  
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In light of this diversity, any attempt to define a particular typology of association agreements faces 
significant limits. The EU’s association practice is not the result of a pre-determined strategy but rather 
the consequence of a pragmatic approach towards the establishment of privileged relations with a wide  
range of third countries. A distinction may be based upon geographical criteria (European vs. non-
European), the type of agreement (bilateral vs. multilateral) or the finalité of the established relationship. 
Association agreements with European countries may either be conceived of as a stepping-stone towards 
accession or as an alternative for membership. With non-European countries, the concept of association 
has proven to be an attractive instrument for creating a flexible legal framework with strategically 
important partners.  
 
Pre-accession instruments EU membership alternatives Privileged relationships with 
non-European countries 
Association agreements with 
Turkey and Greece* 
European Economic Area (EEA) African, Caribbean and Pacific 
 (ACP) countries 
Europe Agreements∗ Bilaterals I (Switzerland) Euro-Mediterranean Association 
Agreements (EMAAs) 
Stabilisation and Association 
 Agreements (AAAs) 
Eastern Partnership (EaP) 
countries (Ukraine, Moldova, 
Georgia) 
Chile, Central America**, 
 Mercosur*** 
Table 1: A typology of association agreements 
 
                                                          
 
∗ This (type of) agreement is no longer in force. ** This agreement has been signed and provisionally applied but is not yet fully 
into force; *** This agreement is still under negotiation. 
Figure 1: Map of third countries 'associated' with the EU 
 EU  EU membership alternative  Third countries (non-ACP) 
 Pre-accession  ACP countries  
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3.1. Association agreements as pre-accession instruments 
The existence of an association agreement is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
membership. From a legal perspective, it is perfectly possible to join the EU without a prior association 
agreement. This was the case with the accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Spain and 
Portugal. Of course, the establishment of privileged relations in the form of an association agreement 
may be a useful tool in the preparations for membership but new and additional commitments must 
always be negotiated in light of the specific rules and procedures for accession as laid down in Article 49 
TEU.75 This implies that EU accession can only become a reality after a process of accession negotiations 
leading to the conclusion of an accession treaty between the existing Member States and the applicant 
country. In any event, the link between association and (potential) accession is only relevant with respect 
to European states that are committed to respecting and promoting the EU’s foundational values as 
defined under Article 2 TEU.76 Whether or not such a link materialises in practice essentially depends upon 
the evolving political context.  
 
There is no specific model of pre-accession association agreements but, in general, three generations of 
relevant agreements may be distinguished.77 In the first place, the agreements with Greece and Turkey 
concluded in 1961 and 1963 respectively had an explicit pre-accession dimension. Second, the Europe 
Agreements (EAs) concluded with the CEECs in the 1990s became important pre-accession instruments 
following the 1993 Copenhagen European Council. Third, the Stabilisation and Association Agreements 
(SAAs) with the Western Balkans all refer to the potential candidate status of the countries concerned and 
are an important instrument of the EU’s enlargement policy. 
3.1.1. The ‘first generation’ of pre-accession association agreements 
 
The very first bilateral association agreements, concluded with Greece and Turkey in 1961 and 1963 
respectively, had an explicit pre-accession dimension. For instance, the preamble of both association 
agreements included the identical provision that the support given by the EEC would facilitate the 
accession of the associated country at a later date. Both agreements also explicitly provided that the 
contracting parties “shall examine the possibility of the accession of [Greece/Turkey] to the Community” 
as soon as the operation of the agreement had advanced far enough.78 Several other provisions closely 
followed the structure of the EEC Treaty and aimed at gradually establishing a customs union and the 
introduction of free movement of workers and services. Hence, the Athens and Ankara Agreements could 
be qualified as ‘pre-accession association agreements’.79  
 
It is difficult to assess the precise impact of the 1961 association agreement on the EEC accession of 
Greece in 1981, but the explicit membership objective certainly facilitated this process.80 With respect to 
Turkey, the picture is more sophisticated. The 1963 Ankara Agreement only provided the general 
framework for the development of privileged relations. An additional protocol, signed in 1970 and 
entered into force in 1973, introduced more specific commitments regarding the gradual establishment 
of the customs union and the envisaged introduction of free movement of persons and services. For this 
purpose, the association council had to adopt the necessary implementing decisions. Even though the 
latter failed to take the measures required for the introduction of a free movement regime between 
                                                          
 
75 Maresceau, op. cit., note 27, p. 320. 
76 Art 49 (1) TEU. 
77 The association agreements with Cyprus and Malta are not explicitly mentioned in this typology since they did not include any 
reference to future membership perspectives but only aimed at the gradual establishment of a customs union. This exclusive 
focus on trade integration did not prevent the successful membership application of both countries leading to their accession in 
May 2004.  
78 Article 28 of the Ankara Agreement and Article 73 of the Athens Agreement.  
79 Maresceau, op. cit. note 27, pp. 321-339.  
80 Ibid., p. 325. 
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the EU and Turkey, this institutional body played a crucial role in the deepening of the bilateral 
relations. It significantly strengthened the legal position of Turkish workers inside the Union81 and 
provided for the establishment of the customs union with the adoption of Decision No 1/95 in 
December 1995. 
 
The EU-Turkey association acquis, including the association agreement, the additional protocol and the 
association council decisions, has been the subject of multiple proceedings before the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU). Whereas a detailed analysis of this abundant case law would go beyond 
the scope of the present study,82 the Court’s interpretation of the objectives of the established 
association deserve particular attention. In several judgments, the Court unequivocally observed that 
the purpose of Turkey’s association is “to promote the development of trade and economic relations 
between the contracting parties […] so as to improve the living conditions of Turkish people and 
facilitate the accession of the Republic of Turkey to the Community at a later date”.83 Consequently, the 
Court has always adopted a so-called ‘integration-oriented approach’ implying that the provisions of 
the bilateral EU-Turkey legal instruments should be interpreted ‘so far as possible’ in correspondence 
with similar provisions under EU law.84  
In El Yassini, the Court stressed the more ambitious objectives of the established association with 
Turkey in comparison to a less far-reaching cooperation agreement with Morocco.85 As a result, rights 
granted to Turkish workers could not simply be transposed to Moroccan workers notwithstanding the, 
at first sight, comparable formation of certain provisions in the bilateral agreements with both 
countries. In its more recent case law, the Court emphasized the limits of Turkey’s association. In 
particular, it upheld that “in deciding whether a provision of European Union law lends itself to 
application by analogy under the EEC-Turkey Association, a comparison must be made between the 
objective pursued by the Association Agreement and the context of which it forms a part, on the one 
hand, and those of the European Union law instrument in question, on the other”.86 In applying this test, 
the Court largely ignored the pre-accession nature of the Ankara Agreement when it underlined the 
essentially economic character of the established relationship.87 As a result, the EU-Turkey association 
acquis does not imply the analogous interpretation of rights derived from the EU’s citizenship directive 
2004/3888 or from the EU treaty provisions relating to the freedom of services.89  
Despite its pre-accession orientation, the substantive scope of the Ankara Agreement is less far-reaching 
on certain aspects than other association agreements. This is partly due to temporal factors, in the sense 
that the European integration process was less developed when the agreement was negotiated, and 
partly due to the absence of explicit provisions relating to the homogenous interpretation of similarly 
worded provisions. The political context of EU-Turkey relations cannot be ignored either. 
Notwithstanding the recognition of Turkey as a candidate country and a key partner for the EU, the 
association council failed to adopt further implementation measures aimed at a substantive deepening 
                                                          
 
81 In this respect, Council decisions 2/76, 1/80 and 3/83 turned out to be particularly important. For comments, see: M. Maresceau, 
‘Turkey: A Candidate State Destined to Join the Union’, in: N. Niamh Shuibhne and L. W. Gormley (eds.), From Single Market to 
Economic Union. Essays in Honour of John A Usher, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 321-322.  
82 For an analysis of this case law, see e.g. K. Groenendijk, ‘The Court of Justice and the Development of EEC-Turkey Association 
Law’, in: D. Thym and M. Zoeteweij-Turhan (eds.), Rights of Third-Country Nationals under EU Association Agreements. Degrees of 
Free Movement and Citizenship, Leiden-Boston, Brill-Nijhoff, 2015, pp. 39-64.   
83 Case C-37/98, Savas, EU:C:2000:224, para. 52 (emphasis added). 
84 Maresceau, ‘Turkey: A Candidate State Destined to Join the Union’, op. cit. note 81, pp. 323-330. 
85 Case C-416/96, El Yassini v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, EU:C:1999:107. 
86 Case C-371/08, Ziebell, EU:C:2011:809, para. 62 and Case C-221/11, Demirkan, EU:C:2013:583, para. 48. 
87 Demirkan, EU:C:2013:583, paras 50 and 26. In Ziebel, the Court even upheld that the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement pursues 
‘a solely economic purpose’ (para. 64). See also V. Hatzopoulos, ‘Turkish Service Recipients under the EU-Turkey Association 
Agreement: Demirakan’, Common Market Law Review, 2014, pp. 647-664.  
88 Case C-371/08, Ziebell, EU:C:2011:809.  
89 Case C-221/11, Demirkan, EU:C:2013:583.  
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of the bilateral relationship beyond the customs union and the decisions of the 1980s governing the 
position of Turkish workers and their family members. 
3.1.2. The ‘Europe Agreements’ with the Central and Eastern European countries 
 
After the fall of the Berlin wall, the European Community offered the prospect of association to the Central 
and Eastern European countries (CEECs) engaged in economic and political reform.90 A new generation 
of association agreements, called ‘Europe Agreements’ (EAs) to mark their political significance, upgraded 
and replaced the initially concluded trade and economic cooperation agreements. The EAs introduced a 
political dialogue, provided for the gradual establishment of bilateral free trade areas and formed the 
basis for economic, cultural and financial cooperation. In addition, they contained provisions on 
movement of persons, establishment, supply of services, payments, capital, competition and 
approximation of laws. Even though all EAs have been replaced by accession treaties, a brief analysis of 
this type of agreement is relevant for understanding the mechanism of association.  
 
Significantly, the EAs were initially conceived as alternatives to membership. This explains why the 
agreements concluded before the 1993 Copenhagen European Council with Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia did not have an explicit pre-accession orientation. It was only after the EU’s political 
decision that the associated countries from Central and Eastern Europe could become member states 
upon fulfilment of political, economic and legal conditions that the EAs became de facto instruments for 
pre-accession. However, this political reorientation of the EAs did not result in a formal amendment of 
the preamble to the agreements or to the signing of an additional protocol. Only the EAs with the Baltic 
States and Slovenia, which were negotiated and signed after the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, 
included a reference to the ‘accession preparation strategy’.91 The latter agreements also included a new 
title on the prevention of illegal activities. The increased attention to new security threats such as irregular 
migration, trafficking in drugs, smuggling of nuclear materials and all forms of organized crime explains 
this evolution. In other words, the material scope of association agreements also depends upon the 
evolving societal context.  
  
Last but not least, it is worth mentioning the differences between the EAs with the CEECs and the less far-
reaching Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) concluded with the former Soviet republics in 
the same period. The latter differ from association agreements with respect to their legal basis and the 
degree of rapprochement with the EU.92 For instance, the PCAs do not aim at the integration of third 
countries in the EU legal system but refer to more modest ambitions of political and economic 
cooperation. In comparison to the EAs, they do not provide for the gradual establishment of free trade. 
Both types of agreements also significantly differ with regard to the institutional framework they set out. 
The association councils can take legally binding decisions whereas the cooperation councils established 
under the PCAs can only adopt recommendations. As a result, the association agreements create a more 
dynamic legal framework.   
 
Hence, in the typology of EU external agreements, association agreements may be regarded as more 
advanced than PCAs whereas the latter were conceived as more far-reaching than the initial Trade and 
Cooperation Agreements with the former communist countries. The actual meaning of association thus 
also depends upon the geopolitical context and the EU’s external policy towards a particular region. It is 
                                                          
 
90 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Parliament, ‘Association agreements with the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe: a general outline’, COM (90) 398 final, Brussels, 27 August 1990, p. 2. 
91 For a comparison between the various EAs, see also: K. Inglis, op. cit. note 74. 
92 C. Hillion, The Evolving System of EU External Relations as Evidenced in the EU Partnerships with Russia and Ukraine, Leiden 
University, PhD thesis, 2005, p. 38 et. seq. 9, available at: https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/hillion.pdf.   
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an instrument that indicates the establishment of the most far-reaching form of legal relations in a 
particular geographical area. After the EU accession of the CEECs, the instrument of association allowed 
for the upgrading of bilateral relations with certain post-Soviet countries – Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia 
– whereas the legal differentiation with other, less far-reaching agreements such as the (enhanced) PCAs 
remained (see infra).  
3.1.3. The Stabilisation and Association Agreements with the Western Balkan countries 
 
The Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) concluded with the countries of the Western 
Balkans constitute a cornerstone of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), i.e. the EU’s regional 
policy for South-Eastern Europe. The central objective of the SAP is to foster a process of regional 
reconciliation and cooperation on the basis of common political and economic goals. Of particular 
significance is the offer of a so-called ‘European perspective’ implying that the participating countries are 
recognised as potential candidates for EU membership. This is confirmed in the preamble of the bilateral 
SAAs, creating an explicit link between the successful implementation of the agreement and progress 
towards the objective of membership.  
 
The SAAs are to a large extent modelled upon the earlier EAs. Despite the considerable similarities 
between both types of agreements, a distinct type of association was nevertheless deemed necessary in 
order to tackle the particular challenges in the Western Balkans.93 The most significant difference is the 
focus on stabilisation on the basis of regional cooperation and good neighbourliness. All SAAs have a 
dedicated title devoted to regional cooperation requiring the start of negotiations with other countries 
which signed a SAA in view of the establishment of a political dialogue, free trade, mutual concessions 
concerning the movement of workers, establishment, supply of services, current payments and 
movement of capital and cooperation with respect to justice, freedom and security.94 The 
implementation of this commitment is a condition for the further development of close bilateral relations 
with the EU. This is a remarkable evolution in comparison to the EAs, where the approach of conditionality 
was more implicit and focused on economic and political reform.95  
 
Notwithstanding the largely comparable structure of all SAAs, some noticeable differences can be 
identified. For instance, the SAAs with Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina include an explicit clause 
regarding full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)96 
whereas such a clause is absent in earlier SAAs with Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM). The latest SAA with Kosovo is a special case in the sense that it is concluded as an 
EU-only agreement and with the explicit proviso that this does not constitute recognition of Kosovo as 
an independent state.97 This reality has some implications regarding the formulation of certain provisions 
and the scope of the agreement.98 For instance, the preamble to the SAA with Kosovo carefully avoids 
the words ‘potential candidate Member State’, which can be found in all other SAAs. Alternatively, it uses 
the more diplomatic formula that the implementation of the SAA “will lead to progress in Kosovo’s 
European perspective and rapprochement with the EU, should objective circumstances so permit and 
Kosovo fulfil the criteria defined by the European Council in Copenhagen on 21-22 June 1993 and the 
aforementioned conditionalities”.99 The abundant use of the caveat ‘should objective circumstances so 
permit’ in the preamble but also in several provisions of the SAA reveals the uncertainties regarding the 
                                                          
 
93 D. Phinnemore, ‘Stabilisation and Association Agreements: Europe Agreements for the Western Balkans?’, European Foreign 
Affairs Review, 2003, p. 81. 
94 See e.g. Article 15 of the SAA with Serbia. 
95 Phinnemore, op. cit. note 93, p. 88. 
96 Article 4 of the SAA with Serbia. 
97 Article 2 of the SAA with Kosovo. 
98 For a detailed analysis of these differences, see: P. Van Elsuwege, ‘Legal Creativity in EU External Relations: The Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 2017, pp. 405-408.  
99 Preamble to the EU-Kosovo SAA.  
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development of EU-Kosovo relations. At the same time, it underlines once again the flexible and long-
term legal framework of the established relationship.  
3.2. Association Agreements as alternatives for membership  
3.2.1. The Agreement on the European Economic Area 
 
One of the most far-reaching association agreements is the Agreement on the European Economic Area 
(EEA) between the EU and its Member States, on the one hand, and three participating EFTA States 
(Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein), on the other hand.100 The EEA-agreement aims at ‘the fullest possible 
realization of the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital’, equal conditions for 
competition as well as strengthened cooperation with respect to so-called ‘flanking policies’ such as 
research and development, the environment, education and social policy.101 For this purpose, the EEA 
involves a sophisticated institutional structure ensuring the homogenous interpretation and application 
of the shared legal rules.102  
 
Contrary to traditional forms of voluntary approximation, the objective of homogeneity leads to a form 
of  ‘integration without membership’, implying that the participating EEA countries are under a direct 
legal obligation to apply selected pieces of EU legislation which are to be interpreted and applied as if 
they are a part of the EU.103 In other words, the participating EFTA countries (Norway, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein) have become ‘virtual’ EU Member States which apply the entire internal market legislation 
by analogy.104  
 
The functioning of the EEA is based upon a two-pillar institutional structure with the EU and its 
institutions, on the one hand, and the EEA EFTA States and their institutions, on the other hand. Between 
the two pillars, a number of joint bodies have been established by the EEA Agreement including the EEA 
Council (representatives at ministerial level), the EEA Joint Committee (representatives at civil servant 
level), the EEA Joint Parliamentary Committee (representatives at parliamentary level) and the EEA 
consultative committee (representatives of the social partners). All EU legislation with EEA relevance, i.e. 
concerning an area covered by the EEA agreement, is incorporated in the annexes or protocols to the 
agreement. Taking into account the dynamic development of EU law, the common rules of the EEA 
Agreement are subject to constant revision. Following the adoption of new EU legislation, it is the task of 
the EEA Joint Committee to amend the annexes as soon as possible in order to secure the homogeneity 
of the common rules.   
 
The EEA Agreement does not grant the EEA EFTA States any decision-making powers within the EU 
Institutions. However, they play a role at the level of ‘decision-shaping’ in the sense that representatives 
of the EEA EFTA States are involved in the preparation of EEA relevant legislation. They have a right to 
participate in expert groups and commitees of the European Commission and should be consulted in the 
same manner as EU experts.105 Moreover, they have the right to submit comments on legislative 
initiatives, which are officially noted by the EEA Joint Committee after they have been sent to the relevant 
                                                          
 
100 Agreement on the European Economic Area, OJ (1994) L 1/3.  
101 See preamble and Article 1 of the EAA-agreement.  
102 C. Baudenbacher, ‘The goal of homogeneous interpretation of the law in the European Economic Area’, The European Legal 
Forum, 2008, pp. 22-31.  
103 See: M. Maresceau, ‘Les accords d’intégration dans les relations de proximité de l’Union Europeénne’, in C. Blumann (ed.), Les 
frontiers de l’Union Européenne, Bruxelles : Bruylant, 2013, pp. 152-191 ; G. Van der Loo, op. cit note 57, pp. 23-27.  
104 N. Rennuy and P. Van Elsuwege, op. cit. note 71, p. 946.  
105 Article 99 EEA Agreement. Twice a year, the EEA Joint Committee publishes progress reports providing information about the 
involvement of the EFTA States in the shaping of EU legislation. These reports can be consulted at the website of the EEA Council 
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services of the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council.106 However, they have 
no voting rights within the EU institutions. Such decision-making powers at the EU level cannot be 
granted on the basis of association and are part of the prerogatives of EU membership. This basic rule 
stems from the autonomy of the EU legal order and has i.a. been reiterated in the framework of the Brexit 
discussions. For instance, the  European Council guidelines on the framework for the future EU-UK 
relationship explicitly provide that “the Union will preserve its autonomy as regards its decision-making, 
which excludes participation of the UK as a third country in the EU Institutions and participation in the 
decision-making of EU bodies, offices and agencies.’107 
3.2.2. The ‘sectoral’ association of Switzerland 
 
Despite the absence of a comprehensive association agreement in the relations between the EU and 
Switzerland, the concept of association is also relevant in this context. It is well known that Switzerland 
rejected the ratification of the EEA agreement in a popular referendum and opted instead for a dense 
network of bilateral agreements without an overarching institutional structure. In principle, Article 217 
TFEU only covers agreements of a general nature and is, therefore, not very appropriate for the conclusion 
of sectoral agreements which are related to a more specific material legal basis in the EU Treaties. 
However, in 1999, a series of seven agreements, connected through a guillotine clause,108 were concluded 
together under the legal basis of Article 217 TFEU. The set of agreements, called Bilaterals I, covered 
various areas such as transport over land, civil aviation, free movement of persons, public procurement 
markets, elimination of technical barriers to trade, research and agriculture. Significantly, the Commission 
originally proposed the relevant sectoral legal bases for the seven agreements but, for reasons of legal 
pragmatism, the Council concluded the Bilaterals I (which anyway formed a ‘horizontal’ package) 
pursuant to the association’s legal basis.109 A subsequent set of nine sectoral agreements, called Bilaterals 
II, was signed in 2004. However, in contrast to the Bilaterals I, every agreement of the Bilaterals II stands 
on its own and has been concluded by a separate Council decision. The absence of this ‘package 
approach’ at the conclusion stage explains why Article 217 TFEU has not been used for the Bilaterals II.110   
 
The peculiar form of ‘sectoral association’, which from a strict legal point of view only applies to the 
Bilaterals I, has significant limitations in comparison to more traditional forms of association. In particular, 
there is no common institutional framework for managing the development of the bilateral relationship. 
On several occasions, the EU recalled that this lacunae creates legal uncertainty for citizens and 
businesses.111  For instance, there is no harmonised legal framework for free movement of financial 
services, leading to ad hoc solutions such as the temporary granting of a recognition of equivalence for 
Swiss share trading values.112 Moreover, by rejecting the EEA Agreement, the Swiss Confederation did not 
subscribe to the objective of establishing an internal market.113 As a result, the interpretation given to 
provisions of EU law concerning the internal market do not automatically apply under the bilateral 
agreement regarding free movement of persons, unless there are express provisions to that effect in the 
agreement itself.114 This is a remarkable difference in comparison to the EEA Agreement, which is based 
                                                          
 
106 See: http://www.efta.int/eea/eea-efta-comments.  
107 European Council (Art. 50) guidelines, Brussels, 23 March 2018, EUCO XT 20001/18, para. 7. S 
108 Pursuant to the guillotine clause, all seven agreements are to enter into force simultaneously and the termination of one of 
them results in the termination of all seven. 
109 See Maresceau, op. cit. note 27, p. 415; Hanf and Dengler, op. cit. note 5, p. 308. 
110 Maresceau, ibid., p. 421. 
111 Council of the EU, Conclusions on EU relations with the Swiss Confederation, doc. 6767/17, Brussels, 28 February 2017. 
112 European Commission, ‘Commission Proposes to extend equivalence for Swiss share trading venues for six months’, Press 
Release IP/18/6801, Brussels, 17 December 2018.  
113 Case C-351/08, Christian Grimme, EU:C:2009:697, para. 27; Case, C-541/08, Focus Invest, EU:C:2010:74, para. 28; Case C-70/09, 
Hengartner and Hassner t. Landesregierung Vorarlberg), EU:C:2010:430, para. 42; Case C-547/10P, Confédération Suisse v. European 
Commission, EU:C:2013:139, para. 80.  
114 Case C-547/10P, Confédération Suisse v. European Commission, EU:C:2013:139, para. 81. 
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upon the homogenous interpretation of the common rules (cf. supra). Hence, the Swiss approach of 
sectoral association provides a less far-reaching model of integration without membership in comparison 
to the EEA. 
 
In order to tackle the identified problems in their bilateral relations, the EU and Switzerland negotiated a 
draft institutional framework agreement. This agreement, which was made public in December 2018 by 
the Swiss government as part of a broad internal consultation process, does not explicitly refer to the 
concept of association.115  However, just as with the Bilaterals I package in 1999, Article 217 TFEU may be 
used as a legal basis for its conclusion and would even seem the most appropriate legal basis given the 
agreement’s ‘framework’ nature.  
3.2.3. Association Agreements with the EU’s Eastern neighbours (Ukraine, Moldova and 
Georgia) 
 
The latest generation of association agreements has been concluded with the EU’s eastern neighbours 
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia within the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), more 
specifically the Eastern Partnership (EaP). The association agreements replace the old PCAs and provide 
for a significant upgrade of the bilateral relations with the countries concerned. Notwithstanding the 
existence of certain differences among the three agreements, they all share a number of common 
characteristics in comparison to other types of association.  
 
The association agreements with the eastern neighbours are among the most ambitious and voluminous 
agreements ever concluded between the EU and third countries.116 They are comprehensive framework 
agreements embracing the whole spectrum of EU activities, from trade to foreign and security policy and 
cooperation in justice and home affairs.117 Of particular significance is the ambition to set up Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs), leading to the gradual and partial integration of the 
associated countries into the EU internal market. This implies a far-reaching liberalisation of trade in 
goods and services and the abolition of non-tariff barriers through regulatory convergence with regard 
to issues such as the protection of intellectual property rights, competition law, rules of origin, labour 
standards and environmental protection.  
 
In order to ensure the effective implementation of those commitments, the agreements are based upon 
a strict conditionality approach. Broadly speaking, two different forms of conditionality can be 
distinguished. On the one hand, several provisions relate to the associated countries’ commitment to the 
common values of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms set 
out in Article 2 TEU. On the other hand, the part on the DCFTA is based on an explicit ‘market access 
conditionality’ implying that additional access to a section of the EU internal market will only be granted 
if the association council decides, after a strict monitoring procedure, that the legislative approximation 
commitments are adequately implemented. This form of conditionality is a rather unique feature of this 
type of association agreements and corresponds to the general approach of the ENP and the EaP.118    
 
This policy context also explains why the association agreements carefully avoid any direct reference to 
future membership perspectives but somewhat diplomatically acknowledge the ‘European aspirations’ 
and the ‘European choice’ of the associated countries. This formulation does not entail any legal or 
political commitment towards further enlargement on behalf of the Union. The association agreements 
with the eastern neighbours can, therefore, not be regarded as pre-accession instruments. This view is 
                                                          
 
115 See: https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/dea/fr/documents/abkommen/Acccord-inst-Projet-de-texte_fr.pdf.  
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117 See Title II and III of the AAs. 
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confirmed in the decision adopted by the Heads of State or Government of the EU Member States in 
response to the concerns expressed in the framework of the Dutch referendum on the bill approving the 
EU-Ukraine association agreement.119   
 
Nevertheless, the agreements do not exclude a further evolution of the established relationship in the 
future. This is expressed in so many words in the preamble to the agreements. In addition, the parties 
explicitly recognize that the associates are (Eastern) European countries sharing a common history and 
common values with the EU Member States of the EU and are committed to the promotion of those 
values.120 The parallels with the first sentence of Article 49 TEU are obvious. Moreover, it is noteworthy 
that several provisions reflect the formulation of the Copenhagen pre-accession criteria.121 Hence, 
depending upon the evolving political context, a potential re-orientation of the association agreements 
cannot be excluded. For the time being, however, it is clear that the agreements solely aim at the 
establishment of close and privileged links without any membership objective.  
3.2.4. Association as a means to define the EU-UK relationship post-Brexit?  
 
On 23 June 2016 UK citizens voted to leave the EU, leading to the start of the withdrawal procedure 
foreseen under Article 50 TEU on 29 March 2017 after Prime Minister Theresa May formally notified the 
European Council of the UK’s intention to leave the EU. At the time of writing, the fate of the draft 
withdrawal agreement and the shape of the future relationship between the EU and the UK were still 
unclear. As observed in previous studies, the post-Brexit relations may be inspired by the experience of 
other agreements. For instance, Franklin Dehousse compared the association agreement with Ukraine 
and the Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada as potential models122 whereas 
Piet Eeckhout pointed at the fundamental difference between the paradigms of market integration or 
trade integration.123 Without entering into the details of this discussion, both authors agree about the 
importance of  a common institutional framework for the governance of post-Brexit relations between 
the EU and the UK.  
 
The significance of a coherent and solid governance system for the management of future EU-UK 
relations is also highlighted in a European Parliament resolution of 14 March 2018.124 This resolution 
explicitly suggests that “an association agreement negotiated and agreed between the EU and the UK 
following the latter’s withdrawal pursuant to Article 8 TEU and Article 217 TFEU could provide an 
appropriate framework”. Moreover, it proposes that this future relationship should be based on four 
pillars, including trade and economic relations; foreign policy, security cooperation and development 
cooperation; internal security and thematic cooperation.  
 
                                                          
 
119 European Council Conclusions on Ukraine, Brussels, 15 December 2016, available at:  
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120 It is noteworthy that the preamble to the association agreement with Georgia recognizes Georgia as an ‘Eastern European 
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It is noteworthy that point 122 of the political declaration of 22 November 2018 setting out the framework 
for the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom125 also provides that 
the overarching institutional framework could take the form of an association agreement:   
 
“PART IV: INSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER HORIZONTAL ARRANGEMENTS  
I. STRUCTURE  
 
120. The future relationship should be based on an overarching institutional framework covering 
chapters and linked agreements relating to specific areas of cooperation, while recognising that the 
precise legal form of this future relationship will be determined as part of the formal negotiations. 
Where appropriate, the Parties may establish specific governance arrangements in individual areas.   
 
121. The Parties may also decide that an agreement should sit outside of the overarching institutional 
framework, and in those cases should provide for appropriate governance arrangements.   
 
122. The Parties note that the overarching institutional framework could take the form of an 
Association Agreement.  
 
123. The Parties should provide for the possibility to review the future relationship. 
 
Source: Political declaration of 22 November 2018 setting out the framework for the future relationship between 
the European Union and the United Kingdom.  
 
The association formula would indeed have several advantages. From a pragmatic point of view, it avoids 
potentially complex discussions regarding the choice of the correct legal basis for the new legal 
arrangement. In addition, the experience of the EU’s bilateral relations with Switzerland illustrates the 
importance of a well-designed institutional structure in order to guarantee legal certainty for citizens and 
businesses. Moreover, the establishment of joint bodies with decision-making powers allows for the 
dynamic development of the future relationship. Finally, the existence of a comprehensive association 
agreement does not prevent the parallel conclusion of other, separate agreements covering specific 
areas of cooperation but would at least ensure a coherent institutional structure for the management of 
the bilateral EU-UK relationship after Brexit.  
3.3. Association Agreements as a framework for privileged relations with non-European 
countries 
 
A third group with which association agreements have been concluded consists of non-European 
countries. This means that the EU (and the third countries concerned) have set up an association, even if 
the third countries concerned have no possibility or prospect of joining the EU. Within this group, a 
further division can be made between the historically grown association with the ACP countries, the 
conclusion of association agreements in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the 
more recent proliferation of association agreements in relation to countries in Central and Latin America.   
3.3.1. Association of the ACP countries  
 
At the initial stages of the European integration process, the instrument of ‘association’ was used to 
develop privileged relations with the former colonies of the EEC Member States. This was particularly the 
                                                          
 
125https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/political-declaration-setting-out-framework-future-relationship-between-
european-union-and-united-kingdom_en. 
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case for the so-called African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) countries, which had close connections with either 
France or the United Kingdom. In 1963, the EEC and 18 Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM) 
signed the first convention in Yaoundé, the capital of Cameroon. This convention was later extended and 
replaced by the Lomé convention in 1975, which provided the framework for development cooperation 
with the ACP countries. The Lomé  convention went through four rounds of revision and, despite its 
primary focus on trade and development, it was based on the treaty provision for association. Apart from 
the close historical ties with several Member States, the absence of a specific legal basis related to 
development cooperation in the EEC Treaty explains this choice.  
 
Even though a specific competence on development cooperation has been introduced with the Treaty 
of Maastricht, the Cotonou agreement, which replaced the Lomé convention in 2002, is also concluded 
on the legal basis of association. This is due to the broad objectives of this multilateral framework, which 
involves the EU’s relations with 78 ACP countries. It includes a political dialogue and covers a wide range 
of areas including not only traditional forms of development cooperation but also issues such as peace 
and security, arms trade and migration. The Cotonou agreement also provides the basis for economic 
partnership agreements with certain ACP countries. Due to their more specific focus, the latter are not 
concluded on the basis of Article 217 TFEU but refer to the treaty provisions on development cooperation 
(Article 207 (3) and (4) TFEU) and common commercial policy (Article 209 (2) TFEU).126 In the meantime, 
negotiations for a new EU-ACP framework agreement started in September 2018. Even though the legal 
basis of this new agreement is still to be determined, the broad negotiating mandate as well as the legacy 
of association in relation to the ACP countries imply that Article 217 TFEU may be used again.  
 
Finally, a special reference should be made to the EU’s relations with South Africa. This country is a 
member of the ACP group and a party to the Cotonou agreement. In addition, a bilateral Trade, 
Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) entered into force in 2004.127 Despite the absence of 
any reference to the concept of ‘association’ in the title of this agreement, it is legally based on article 217 
TFEU. It is noteworthy that other agreements, which are largely comparable in terms of substance,128 are 
not based on this provision. The significance of South Africa as a strategic partner for the EU as well as the 
link with the Cotonou agreement may be possible explanations. Moreover, pragmatic concerns may have 
played a role as well since the comprehensive scope of article 217 TFEU avoids the more complex exercise 
of combining substantive legal bases.129  
3.3.2. The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements 
 
The conclusion of bilateral association agreements with seven countries of the Southern Mediterranean 
(Tunisia, Morocco, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Algeria and Lebanon)130 between 1998 and 2006 must be situated 
within the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). The latter, also known as the Barcelona 
process, started in 1995 and aimed at the establishment of a regular dialogue on political and security 
                                                          
 
126 See e.g. Council Decision (EU) 2016/1623 of 1 June 2016 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union and provisional 
application of the Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and 
the SADC EPA States, of the other part, OJ (2016) L 205/1.  
127 Whereas the TDCA remains in in force, it is noteworthy that its provisions relating to trade and trade-related issues have been 
replaced by the Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and the South African Development Community (SADC). See 
protocol No 4 to this agreement, OC (2016) L 205/2109.     
128 Reference can, for instance, be made to the Economic Partnership, Political Co-ordination and Co-operation Agreement with 
Mexico.  
129 In this respect, it is noteworthy that the institutional framework of the TDCA with South Africa is less developed in comparison 
to traditional association agreements. See also Maresceau, op. cit. note 27, p. 421.  
130 The EU concluded a ‘Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and co-operation’ with the Palestine 
Liberalisation Organisation (PLO) in 1997 but this was no a proper association agreement in the sense that is was more limited in 
scope and not based on Article 217 TFEU. A Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement with Syria was initialled in 2004 and, 
after a revision, in 2008 but it was never signed. Libya is the other country from the Southern Mediterranean which has no 
association agreement with the EU.  
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matters; economic, trade and financial cooperation including the creation of a free trade area and as well 
as cooperation on social, cultural and human affairs.131 The bilateral ‘Euro-Mediterranean Association 
Agreements’ (EMAAs) replaced the earlier cooperation agreements of the 1970s and provided the legal 
framework for the implementation of the EMP.  
 
The launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 resulted in a further broadening and 
deepening of the EU’s relations with its southern neighbours. For instance, bilateral agreements on 
agricultural, processed agricultural and fisheries products have been concluded in the form of an 
exchange of letters and then added as protocols to the EMAAs with Mediterranean countries such as 
Israel, Egypt, Morocco and Jordan. In addition, new dispute settlement protocols have been concluded 
with Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Morocco. Negotiations on the further liberalisation of trade with 
a view to the establishment of a DCFTA have been launched with Tunisia and Morocco but did not yet 
result in a further amendment of the EMAAs.132  
3.3.3. The proliferation of Association Agreements with Central and Latin America 
 
The instrument of ‘association’ has been used to upgrade the EU’s relations with the countries of Central 
and Latin America, be it with varied success. The conclusion of an interregional association agreement 
between the EU and Mercosur, i.e. the Southern Common Market formed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay 
and Uruguay, was already mentioned as an explicit objective in the 1995 Interregional Framework 
Cooperation Agreement.133 Negotiations to this end started in 1999 but were suspended and relaunched 
several times. At the end of 2018, already more than 35 rounds of negotiations of the trade part of the 
association agreement had taken place. Notwithstanding progress on several issues there is still work to 
be done, notably on cars and car parts, geographical indications, maritime transport and dairy 
products.134  
 
In parallel to the gradual development of its relations with Mercosur, the EU engaged in a deepening of 
its bilateral relations with Chile. The latter country is not a member of Mercosur but concluded in 1996 a 
comprehensive framework cooperation agreement, which was in many ways similar to the 1995 
agreement with Mercosur. This implied, amongst others, the objective of association in the future. In 
contrast to the long and difficult negotiations with Mercosur, the bilateral negotiations with Chile ran 
smoothly and the association agreement was already signed in 2002 and entered into force in 2005.135 
The agreement covers a political dialogue, includes provisions on economic, financial, scientific, 
technological, social and cultural cooperation and several others areas such as the fight against drugs 
and organised crime, alongside a significant part on trade and trade-related matters which resulted in a 
progressive trade liberalisation in industrial and agricultural goods and fisheries. Taking into account 
considerable evolutions since the signature of the agreement, the EU and Chile started negotiations 
towards a modernised association agreement in January 2018. The ambition is “to broaden the current 
scope of the association agreement and adjust it to the new political and economic challenges.”136 This 
includes, amongst others, the progressive and reciprocal further liberalisation of goods and services, 
                                                          
 
131 See: E. Philippart and G. Edwards, 'The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Fragmentation and Reconstruction' European Foreign 
Affairs Review, 1997, pp. 465-489.  
132 G. Van der Loo, ‘Mapping out the Scope and Contents of the DCFTAs with Tunisia and Morocco’, EuroMesco Paper (2016)28, 
available at: https://www.ceps.eu/publications/mapping-out-scope-and-contents-dcftas-tunisia-and-morocco.  
133 Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, on the one part, 
and the Southern Common Market and its Party States, on the other part, OJ (1996) L 69/4. 
134 Information about the state of play of the negotiations can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/regions/mercosur/. 
135 Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the 
Republic of Chile, of the other part, OJ (2002) L 352/3.  
136 Council of the EU, Directives for the negotiation of a Modernised Association Agreement with Chile, doc. 13553/17, Brussels, 
22 January 2018.  
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investment, access to public procurement opportunities, the protection of intellectual property rights 
and the elimination, reduction and prevention of non-tariff barriers. It is noteworthy that the Council 
negotiation directives refer to “the widest possible scope for cooperation from which no field of activity 
should in principle be excluded.”137 This confirms the typically comprehensive nature of association 
agreements as legal instruments for the development of close political and economic relations in several 
areas.    
 
Apart from the envisaged conclusion of an association agreement with Mercosur and the modernisation 
of the agreement with Chile, the EU already signed an association agreement with Central America (Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama) in 2012.138 The agreement covers rather 
traditional provisions on political dialogue, cooperation and trade. The latter part is provisionally 
applicable in anticipation of the finalization of the ratification procedure. Finally, it is noteworthy that a 
rather similar association agreement was anticipated with the Andean Community (Bolivia Colombia, 
Ecuador and Peru). However, following a breakdown of negotiations in the second half of 2008 – due to 
a lack of consensus among the Andean countries concerning the scope and objectives of the trade part 
of the envisaged agreement – a new negotiating format was put in place from January 2009 onwards. 
This implied continued regional negotiations with the Andean Community as a whole on political 
dialogue and cooperation, on the one hand, and 'multi-party' trade negotiations with Peru, Colombia and 
Ecuador, on the other hand. This resulted in the conclusion of a trade agreement with Colombia and Peru 
in 2012.139 A protocol regarding the accession of Ecuador to this agreement was signed in 2016.140 With 
respect to the non-trade related aspects, the ratification of a political dialogue and cooperation 
agreement with the Andean Community and its Member States is still pending. The proposed Council 
decision for the conclusion of this agreement does not refer to Article 217 TFEU but to Article 37 TEU 
(CFSP) and 207 TFEU (common commercial policy) and 209 TFEU (development cooperation) as the 
substantive legal bases.141 In terms of substance, however, the combination of the separate trade 
agreement and this agreement on political dialogue and cooperation comes close to the type of 
association with Central America. A key difference, however, is the less developed institutional 
framework, in particular the absence of an association council with decision-making powers and other 
joint institutions such as an association committee, sub-committees, and an association parliamentary 
committee.     
 
 
 
 
  
  
                                                          
 
137 Ibid. p. 10. This includes a non-exhaustive list of 45 areas of cooperation.  
138 Agreement establishing an association between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Central 
America of the other part, OJ (2012) L 346/3.  
139 Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, on the one part, and Colombia and Peru, on the other 
part, OJ (2012) L 354/3. 
140 Protocol of Accession to the Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and 
Colombia and Peru, of the other part, to take account of the accession of Ecuador, OJ (2016) L 356/3.  
141 European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Proposal for a 
Council Decision on the conclusion of a Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and 
its Member States, of the one part, and the Andean Community and its Member countries of the other part, JOIN (2016) 4 final, 
Brussels, 3 February 2016.  
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4. COMMON FEATURES OF ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS 
 KEY FINDINGS  
• Since EU integration itself has evolved over the years, so has the content of association 
agreements. Today they typically consist of three substantive components: political dialogue, 
trade liberalisation and sectoral cooperation (in an ever increasing number of areas). 
• Association agreements typically set up a multilevel institutional structure through which the 
agreement is implemented and through which disputes between the parties may be settled. 
• Association agreements typically include an association council  (ministerial level), an association 
committee with technical sub-committees (senior official level) and a parliamentary committee. 
The latest association agreements also include a civil society platform.  
4.1. Scope and content 
 
The flexibility provided by Article 217 TFEU first of all translates in the substantive scope and content of 
association agreements. The oldest association agreements have an almost exclusive focus on economic 
integration of the third country with the addition of a future membership perspective. This may be 
explained in light of the parallelism already noted above: since the EU in the 1960s was almost exclusively 
an economic community, its association agreements were a reflection of this. However, as the EU 
developed and diversified its internal policies this was also reflected in the association agreements that it 
concluded. In terms of scope, association agreements today typically cover three main dimensions: 
political cooperation, economic integration and a basis (which may already be developed by the 
agreement to a varying degree) for sector specific cooperation. Of course these three dimensions do not 
categorically distinguish the association agreements from other comprehensive framework agreements 
such as (enhanced) partnership and cooperation agreements142 The real difference therefore lies in the 
depth of the commitments (rather than the scope) entered into by both the EU and the third country. For 
instance, the CEPA with Armenia essentially differs from the association agreements with Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia because it does not aim at the gradual integration of the country in the EU internal 
market by setting up a DCFTA. Instead, it aims to establish enhanced trade cooperation and regulatory 
cooperation “in compliance with the rights and obligations arising from WTO membership.”143 Whereas 
association allows the EU to enter into such far-reaching commitments that the third country involved is 
almost equated with an EU Member State in relation to the application of certain parts of the acquis, this 
is not possible through a ‘mere’ cooperation agreement.  
 
To make the sometimes rather abstract notions on political, economic and sectoral cooperation more 
concrete, the present study will draw the reader’s attention to some notable differences between the 
provisions which may be found in association agreements and similar provisions in agreements 
concluded pursuant to legal bases other than Article 217 TFEU. 
  
                                                          
 
142 For instance, the EPCA with Kazakhstan or the CEPA with Armenia. 
143 Compare Article 1 (2) d of the EU-Ukraine AA with Article 1 (d) of the EU-Armenia CEPA.  
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4.1.1. Political dimension 
 
Today, association agreements typically have a well-developed political dimension, which includes 
provisions on political dialogue, human rights, cooperation on foreign policy, disarmament, etc. 
 
The EAs with the CEECs in the 1990s were the first association agreements with a provision on political 
dialogue (see infra).144 While a political dialogue allowing the EU and the third country to discuss any area 
of mutual interest, including also domestic reforms, can also be found in agreements other than 
association agreements, political dialogue in an association setting may be more far-reaching. This can 
be illustrated when the AA with Georgia is compared to the CEPA with Armenia. While both agreements 
are not per se representative of their kind, they have been concluded with two very similar countries of 
the same region (Southern Caucasus) in the same time span. 
 
Article 3(1) CEPA Armenia Article 3(1) AA Georgia 
[Political] dialogue will increase the effectiveness 
of political cooperation on foreign policy and 
security matters 
[Political dialogue] will increase the effectiveness 
of political cooperation and promote convergence 
on foreign and security matters 
Table 2: Political dialogue provisions 
 
Thus, the finalité of the political dialogue in both agreements (although worded virtually identically) is 
fundamentally different. 
 
The inclusion of clauses on political dialogue in association agreements must be understood in light of 
the historical development of the EU’s external relations. With the fall of the iron curtain, the EU was 
confronted with young or even (re-)nascent democracies. Given this context, the EAs contained an 
important political dimension to consolidate political reforms in the associated countries. A sufficiently 
stable political basis to build on is necessary to contemplate the conclusion of an association agreement. 
This was not the case with respect to the former Soviet republics, which explains the preference for less 
far-reaching partnership and cooperation agreements in relation to these countries.145 Amongst other 
reasons, such as the countries’ ambitions in relation to the EU, this also explains why recent agreements 
with countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Kazakhstan have not been concluded as association 
agreements.  
 
Since the second round of EAs, the EU consistently insisted on including human rights clauses, which also 
constitute essential elements of the agreement. 146 The EU subsequently included similar provisions in 
other association agreements.147 While such provisions are now also typically included in ‘mere’ 
cooperation agreements,148 Wessel and Van Vooren argue that a human rights clause qualified as an 
essential element of the agreement has become a defining feature of the association agreement.149 A 
comparison of the human rights clauses in four different association agreements shows how the clause 
has been developed over time and is adapted in light of  the finality of the association relationship.   
                                                          
 
144 Gaudissart, op. cit. note 73, p. 19. 
145 Maresceau, op. cit. note 27, p. 347. 
146 Qualifying a provision of an agreement as an essential element allows the parties to terminate or suspend the application of 
the agreement more easily pursuant to Article 60(3)(b) VCLT. 
147 See L. Bartels, ‘A Legal Analysis of Human Rights Clauses in the European Union's Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements’, 
Mediterranean Politics, 2004, 9(3), p. 368. 
148 See, for instance, Article 1 of the EPCA with Kazakhstan, OJ 2016 L 29/3. 
149 R. Wessel and B. Van Vooren, EU External Relations Law – Text, Cases and Materials, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2014, p. 63. 
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Article 6 AA 
Bulgaria  
Article 2(1) AA 
Estonia 
 
Article 2 AA  
Egypt  
Article 2 SAA  
Serbia  
 
Respect for the 
democratic principles 
and human rights 
established by the 
Helsinki Final Act and 
the Charter of Paris 
for a New Europe 
inspires the domestic 
and external policies 
of the Parties and 
constitutes an 
essential element of 
the present 
association 
 
Respect for democratic 
principles and human 
rights, established by the 
Helsinki Final Act and in the 
Charter of Paris for a New 
Europe, as well as the 
principles of market 
economy, inspire the 
domestic and external 
policies of the Parties and 
constitute essential 
elements of this 
 Agreement. 
 
Relations between 
the Parties, as well as 
all the provisions of 
the Agreement itself, 
shall be based on 
respect of democratic 
principles and 
fundamental human 
rights as set out in the 
Universal Declaration 
on Human Rights, 
which guides their 
internal and 
international policy 
and constitutes an 
essential element of 
this Agreement. 
Respect for democratic 
principles and human rights 
as proclaimed in the 
Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and as 
defined in the Convention 
for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, in the Helsinki 
Final Act and the Charter of 
Paris for a New Europe, 
respect for principles of 
international law, including 
full cooperation with the 
International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the rule 
of law as well as the 
principles of market 
economy as reflected in the 
Document of the CSCE Bonn 
Conference on Economic 
Cooperation, shall form the 
basis of the domestic and 
external policies of the 
Parties and constitute 
essential elements of this 
Agreement. 
Table 3: Evolution of essential elements provisions 
 
The EA with Bulgaria150 signed in 1993 contains the so-called Bulgarian clause,151 which was slightly 
modified in the EA with Estonia signed in 1995.152 In contrast, the agreement with Egypt signed in 2001 
evidently does not have a pre-accession objective.153 As a result, it does not foresee the economic 
integration of Egypt in the EU and left out a reference to the market economy. Given Egypt’s non-
European status the agreement also only refers to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Going back 
to an agreement with a pre-accession component, the SAA with Serbia contains a significantly elaborated 
human rights clause, adding a reference to the rule of law and taking into account Serbia’s and the 
Western Balkans’ peculiar (territorial and historical) situation.  
 
Again, juxtaposing a number of more recent agreements with similar countries also shows 
differences in the commitments entered into under an association agreement when compared 
to a cooperation agreement.154 
                                                          
 
150 See OJ 1994 L 358/3. 
151 On the Bulgarian clause, see also E. Fierro, European Union's Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice, Leiden, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2003, pp. 223 et. seq. 
152 See OJ 1998 L 68/3. 
153 See OJ 2004 L 304/39. 
154 For the EPCA with Kazakhstan, see OJ 2016 L 29/3; for the AA with Ukraine, see OJ 2014 L 161/3. 
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Article 1 EPCA 
Kazakhstan 
Article 2(1) CEPA 
Armenia 
Article 2(1) AA 
Georgia 
Article 2(1) AA  
Ukraine  
 
Respect for 
democratic 
principles and 
human rights as 
laid down in the 
Universal 
Declaration of 
Human Rights, 
the OSCE Helsinki 
Final Act and the 
Charter of Paris 
for a New Europe, 
and other 
relevant 
international 
human rights 
instruments, and 
for the principle 
of the rule of law, 
underpins the 
internal and 
international 
policies of both 
Parties and 
constitutes an 
essential element 
of this 
Agreement. 
 
Respect for the 
democratic principles, the 
rule of law, human rights 
and fundamental 
freedoms, as  
 enshrined in particular in 
the UN Charter, the OSCE 
Helsinki Final Act and the 
Charter of Paris for a New 
Europe of 1990, as well as 
other relevant human 
rights instruments such as 
the UN Universal 
Declaration on Human 
Rights and the European 
Convention on Human 
Rights, shall form the basis 
of the domestic and 
external policies of the 
Parties and constitute an 
essential element of this 
Agreement.  
 
Respect for the 
democratic 
principles, human 
rights and 
fundamental 
freedoms, as 
proclaimed in the 
United Nations 
Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights of 
1948 and as defined 
in the European 
Convention for the 
Protection of Human 
Rights and 
Fundamental 
Freedoms of 1950, the 
Helsinki Final Act of 
1975 of the 
Conference on 
Security and 
Cooperation in 
Europe and the 
Charter of Paris for a 
New Europe of 1990 
shall form the basis of 
the domestic and 
external policies of 
the Parties and 
constitutes an 
essential element of 
this Agreement. 
Countering the 
proliferation of 
weapons of mass 
destruction, related 
materials and their 
means of delivery also 
constitute essential 
elements of this 
Agreement. 
 
Respect for democratic 
principles, human rights 
and fundamental 
freedoms, as defined in 
particular in the Helsinki 
Final Act of 1975 of the 
Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe 
and the Charter of Paris for 
a New Europe of 1990, and 
other relevant human 
rights instruments, among 
them the UN Universal 
Declaration of Human 
Rights and the European 
Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, and respect for 
the principle of the rule of 
law shall form the basis of 
the domestic and external 
policies of the Parties and 
constitute essential 
elements of this 
Agreement. Promotion of 
respect for the principles of 
sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, inviolability of 
borders and independence, 
as well as countering the 
proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, related 
materials and their means 
of delivery also constitute 
essential elements of this 
Agreement. 
Table 4: Recent essential elements provision in (non-) association agreements  
 
While all four agreements were signed between 2014 and 2017 and contain a human rights clause, which 
is qualified as an essential element of the agreement, the clauses in the association agreements are more 
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elaborate,155 including references to territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, etc. This again 
may be seen as indicative of the association relationship constituting a more privileged and deeper 
relationship with more far-reaching commitments than an ordinary cooperation relationship.  
4.1.2. Trade liberalisation 
Other than the specific institutional machinery (cf. infra), an element that has been historically present in 
every association agreement relates to trade liberalisation. Some association agreements (notably those 
with Malta and Cyprus) even had an exclusive focus on trade.156 The scope and extent of the trade 
commitments are of course determined by the type of association agreement and the status of the 
partner country. For instance, the objective of establishing a customs union in relation to Turkey cannot 
be disconnected from the explicit pre-accession dimension of this association agreement. Moreover, the 
level and scope of trade integration may develop over time. This is clearly illustrated with the EMAAs, 
which initially only provided for the liberalisation of trade in industrial goods. The addition of protocols, 
concluded in the form of an exchange of letters, allowed for an extension of the free trade regime to 
agricultural and processed agricultural products with certain countries (cf. supra). The latest generation 
of association agreements with the EU’s eastern neighbours provide for the establishment of DCFTAs. In 
comparison to traditional FTAs, the DCFTAs do not only foresee the mutual opening of markets for goods 
but also cover services, competition, intellectual property rights, energy, public procurement, technical 
barriers to trade, etc. The ‘deep’ character of the DCFTAs refers to the process of legislative approximation. 
The DCFTAs include numerous legislative approximation clauses obliging the associated countries to 
apply a selection of EU legislation in their domestic legal order. The objective is to tackle non-tariff barriers 
and to create a common legal space, leading to the gradual and partial integration of the associated 
countries in the EU internal market.157 
 
While a detailed analysis of the precise commitments which the EU and its partners enter into pursuant 
to association agreements cannot be performed here, it is useful to highlight the ultimate finality of the 
trade provisions in different types of agreements, similar to the juxtaposition of the finality of political 
cooperation presented above. In this regard, the plurilateral EEA association agreement and the bilateral 
association agreement with Georgia may be compared with the CEPA with Armenia and the 
comprehensive and economic trade agreement with Canada (CETA).158 While the trade objectives of 
these four agreements are all different to one and other, there is still a remarkable contrast between the 
economic finality of the association agreements and that of the ‘other’ agreements. The two association 
agreements essentially put forward the almost complete159 (if gradual) integration of the partner 
countries in the EU internal market (which establishes the four freedoms). Again, this is not to say that an 
association agreement necessarily foresees a third country’s integration in the internal market 
(something which would in any event seem difficult for non-neighbouring countries) but it would appear 
that such a far-reaching commitment can only be entered into (on the part of the EU) by virtue of an 
association agreement. 
  
                                                          
 
155 Note, however, that the essential element clause in the AA with Georgia does not refer to ‘the rule of law’ (even though the 
preamble and several provisions underline the significance of respect for the rule of law as an important feature and objective of 
the association. See also: N. Ghazaryan, ‘A New Generation of Human Rights Clauses? The Case of Association Agreements in the 
Eastern Neighbourhood’, European Law Review, 2015, pp. 391-410.  
156 Maresceau, op. cit. note 27 p. 318. 
157 Van der Loo, op. cit. note 57, p. 57. 
158 See OJ 2017 L 11/23. 
159 Apart from the EEA agreement, association agreements will typically not go as far as also allowing free movement of workers 
in a way similar to the intra-EU free movement of workers. 
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Preamble CETA Preamble EEA Article 1 CEPA 
Armenia 
Article 1(2) AA 
 Georgia 
 
The Parties resolve to 
create an expanded 
and secure market for 
their goods and 
services through the 
reduction or 
elimination of barriers 
to trade and 
investment. 
 
[The Parties are] 
determined to provide 
for the fullest possible 
realization of the free 
movement of goods, 
persons, services and 
capital within the 
whole European 
Economic Area, as well 
as for strengthened 
and broadened 
cooperation in flanking 
and horizontal policies 
 
The aims of this 
Agreement are: 
(g) to support the 
efforts of the Republic 
of Armenia to develop 
its economic potential 
via international 
cooperation, including 
through the 
approximation of its 
legislation to the EU 
acquis 
 
The aims of this 
association are:  
(g) to support the efforts 
of Georgia to develop its 
economic potential 
through international 
cooperation, including 
through the 
approximation of its 
legislation to that of the 
EU; 
(h) to achieve Georgia's 
gradual economic 
integration into the EU 
Internal Market 
Table 5: Economic aims of ( non-)association agreements 
4.1.3. Sectoral cooperation 
 
The third major part (in substantive terms), which is by now a typical feature of association agreements, 
are the provisions dealing with sectoral cooperation in policy areas other than political cooperation or 
free trade. These provisions may be rather general and programmatic in nature but they provide a basis 
for further deeper engagement through the institutional bodies set up by the agreement (see infra). This 
again illustrates how an association agreement may set in motion a process of further integration and 
should not be considered as an a goal in itself.  
 
Various areas of cooperation (other than political cooperation and trade) may be identified. Some 
agreements make a distinction between ‘economic cooperation’ (other than trade) and ‘cooperation in 
other areas’.160 Or they spell out the general objectives (and principles) underpinning the cooperation in 
the areas specified.161 In light of what has already been mentioned, it will not come as a surprise that the 
scope and depth of the foreseen cooperation (i.e. the different areas in which cooperation is foreseen and 
the degree to which the basis for cooperation is worked out in the agreement) varies significantly from 
one agreement to the other. As a general rule, the scope and depth of the envisaged cooperation are 
largely determined by the evolution of the EU’s own level of integration and the general international 
context at the time of negotiations. This explains why there appears to be an ever increasing list of areas 
for cooperation in the framework of an association agreement. For instance, the negotiations for a 
modernised agreement with Chile include a non-exhaustive list of 45 areas of cooperation whereas the 
existing association agreement contains around 30 areas. Moreover, in light of their function as 
comprehensive framework agreements, association agreements may also cross-refer to other sectoral 
agreements or dialogues.162 
 
                                                          
 
160 See e.g. the DTCA with South Africa. 
161 See e.g. Articles 24 and 25 of the agreement with Central America; article 87 of the SAA with Serbia.  
162 For instance, the AAs with the Eastern neighbours include cross-references to the Energy Community Treaty and the visa 
liberalisation dialogue.  
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Competition policy is an area for which some basic principles are typically laid down. As the table below 
shows, the degree to which these clauses are developed varies, the principles in the cooperation 
agreement with Kazakhstan being developed only embryonically. 
 
Article 35 DTCA 
 South Africa  
Article 278 AA 
Central America  
Article 73 SAA 
Serbia  
Article 156 EPCA 
Kazakhstan  
 
The following are 
incompatible with 
the proper 
functioning of this 
Agreement, in so far 
as they may affect 
trade between the 
Community and 
South Africa: 
 
(a) agreements and 
concerted practices 
between firms in 
horizontal 
relationships, 
decisions by 
associations of firms, 
and agreements 
between firms in 
vertical 
relationships, which 
have the effect of 
substantially 
preventing or 
lessening 
competition in the 
territory of the 
Community or of 
South Africa, unless 
the firms can 
demonstrate that 
the anti-competitive 
effects are 
outweighed by pro-
competitive ones; 
 
(b) abuse by one or 
more firms of market 
power in the 
territory of the 
Community or of 
South Africa as a 
whole or in a 
substantial part 
thereof. 
 
1. The Parties recognise the 
importance of free and 
undistorted competition in their 
trade relations. The Parties 
acknowledge that anti-
competitive practices have the 
potential to affect the proper 
functioning of markets and the 
benefits of trade liberalisation. 
 
2. The Parties therefore agree 
that the following are 
incompatible with this 
Agreement, in so far as they may 
affect trade 
between the Parties: 
 
(a) agreements between 
undertakings, decisions by 
associations of undertakings 
and concerted practices 
between undertakings, 
which have as their object or 
effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of 
competition as specified in their 
respective competition laws; 
 
b) any abuse by one or more 
undertakings of a dominant 
position or a substantial market 
power or notable market 
participation, as specified in 
their respective competition 
laws; and 
 
(c) concentrations between 
undertakings, which 
significantly 
impede effective competition, 
as specified in their respective 
competition laws. 
 
1. The following are 
incompatible with 
the proper 
functioning of this 
Agreement, insofar 
as they may affect 
trade between the 
Community and 
Serbia: 
 
(i) all Agreements 
between 
undertakings, 
decisions by  
associations of 
undertakings and 
concerted practices 
between 
undertakings which 
have as their object 
or effect the 
prevention, 
restriction or 
distortion of 
competition; 
 
(ii) abuse by one or 
more undertakings 
of a dominant 
position in the 
territories of the 
Community or 
Serbia as a whole or 
in a substantial part 
thereof; 
 
(iii) any State aid 
which distorts or 
threatens to distort 
competition by 
favouring certain 
undertakings or 
certain products. 
 
The Parties recognise 
the importance of 
free and undistorted 
competition in their 
trade relations. The 
Parties acknowledge 
that anti-
competitive 
business practices 
and state 
interventions, 
including subsidies, 
have the potential to 
distort the proper 
functioning of 
markets and 
undermine the 
benefits of trade 
liberalisation. 
  Table 6: Competition law provisions in (non-)association  agreements 
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Other areas that figure in horizontal association agreements are environment, statistical cooperation,  
taxation, youth, public health, education and training, tourism, fisheries, industrial cooperation, small and 
medium sized enterprises, cultural cooperation, social and labour policy, etc. As noted, the degree to 
which the cooperation in these areas is worked out by the agreement itself may vary.163 One key area 
which has not been mentioned yet but which de facto is reserved to associated countries concerns the 
participation of third countries in EU agencies or programmes such as the flagship programme 
Horizon2020.164 
 
While it would not be useful to further compare the clauses on sectoral cooperation to be found in 
association (and non-association) agreements, it is important to stress again the fundamental rule: the EU 
(and its partners) can in principle foresee cooperation on any area which comes under the EU’s internal 
scope of action. Within a single agreement (or even a series of agreements with the same partner) the 
cooperation may be worked out differently from one sector to the next. As long as there is a political 
agreement on this, cooperation could theoretically result in virtual EU membership for the sector 
concerned. Here again, therefore, the flexibility in the association instrument is apparent.  
4.2. Multilevel institutional structure 
 
A common feature of all association agreements is that they contain a number of institutional provisions 
setting up joint bodies, which are responsible for monitoring the execution of the agreement. They are 
also granted decision-making powers to implement the agreement and to further develop the 
association, in line with the framework defined by the agreement.165 As a result, association is to be 
conceived of as a process, rather than as a specific outcome.166 
Even though the institutional framework of association agreements developed over time, they all have a 
multilevel structure involving at least an association council, an association committee (with can by 
assisted by specific sub-committees and other bodies) and a parliamentary committee. The most recent 
generation of association agreements also have a civil society platform.167 The AA with Ukraine stands 
out because it also provides for the annual organisation of summit meetings at the highest political 
level.168    
The association council (or depending on the agreement, the EEA Council, the Stability and Association 
Council, etc.) is typically the main body set up by an association agreement, bringing together 
representatives of the parties at ministerial level with the power to adopt binding decisions by unanimity 
or common accord. For the EU side, the association council includes both members of the Council and 
the European Commission. The Court of Justice has confirmed, since its Sevince ruling, that binding 
decisions of an association council may be directly invoked by private parties before national courts, even 
if the decisions are not published.169   
AA Turkey  SAA Serbia AA Central America AA Ukraine 
 
The Council of 
Association shall 
Article 120 
1.   The Stabilisation 
and Association 
Article 5 
1. The Association 
Council shall be 
Article 462 
1. The Association 
Council shall consist of 
                                                          
 
163 Compare for instance the more elaborate clause on environment in Article 50 of the Central America AA and the embryonic 
Articles 111 in the Serbia SAA and 84 in the agreement with South Africa. 
164 See European Commission, Associated Countries,  http://ec.europa.eu/research/bitlys/h2020_associated_countries.html (last 
accessed 14 January 2019). 
165 For a long time, the decision-making capacity distinguished the institutional framework of association agreements from other 
types of agreement, such as partnership and cooperation agreements. However, the CEPA with Armenia also empowers the 
Partnership Council and Partnership Committee with a competence to adopt binding decisions (see Article 362 and 363 CEPA).    
166 It is noteworthy that Article 2 (2) of the EU-Chile AA refers to the established association as ‘a process that will lead to a growing 
relationship and cooperation between the parties structured around the bodies created in this agreement’. 
167 This is the case for the AAs with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia and the AA with Central America.  
168 Article 460 AA EU-Ukraine. 
169 Case C-192/89, Sevince, ECLI:EU:C:1990:322. 
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consist of members of 
the Governments of 
the Member States 
and members of the 
Council and of the 
Commission of the 
Community on the 
one hand and of 
members of the 
Turkish Government 
on the other. 
 
The members of the 
Council of Association 
may arrange to be 
represented in 
accordance with its 
rules of procedure. 
 
The Council of 
Association shall act 
unanimously. 
Council shall consist of 
the members of the 
Council of the 
European Union and 
members of the 
European 
Commission, on the 
one hand, and of 
members of the 
Government of Serbia 
on the other. 
 
Article 121 
 
The Stabilisation and 
Association Council 
shall, for the purpose 
of attaining the 
objectives of this 
Agreement, have the 
power to take 
decisions within the 
scope of this 
Agreement […] It shall 
draw up its decisions 
and recommendations 
by agreement 
between the Parties. 
composed of 
representatives of the 
EU Party and of each of 
the Republics of the CA 
Party at ministerial 
level, in accordance 
with the Parties' 
respective internal 
arrangements and 
taking into 
consideration the 
specific issues (Political 
Dialogue, Cooperation 
and/or Trade) to be 
addressed at any given 
session. 
 
Article 6 
4. The Association 
Council shall adopt 
decisions and 
recommendations by 
mutual agreement 
between the Parties. In 
the case of the 
Republics of the CA 
Party, the adoption of 
decisions and 
recommendations 
shall require their 
consensus. 
members of the 
Council of the 
European Union and 
members of the 
European 
Commission, on the 
one hand, and of 
members of the 
Government of 
Ukraine, on the other. 
 
Article 463 
 
1. For the purpose of 
attaining the 
objectives of this 
Agreement, the 
Association Council 
shall have the power to 
take decisions within 
the scope of this 
Agreement […] It shall 
adopt its decisions and 
recommendations by 
agreement between 
the Parties, following 
completion of the 
respective internal 
procedures. 
 
Table 7: Association Council composition and decision-making 
 
In general, association councils are endowed with a number of responsibilities.170 First, they are 
responsible for reviewing the implementation of the association agreement and its overall functioning. 
Second, they play a crucial role in the process of legislative approximation in the sense that they provide 
a forum for exchange of information on each other’s legislative frameworks. Moreover, association 
councils may amend pre-specified parts of the agreement and its annexes in order to ensure the dynamic 
development of the established association in light of new developments.171 Third, they are the main 
decision-making body of the association and play a role in the settlement of disputes (see infra). Fourth, 
association councils are the main channel for the established political dialogue, which also takes place at 
other levels (for instance within the Parliamentary committees).  Fifth, the association councils determine 
the duties of the association committee and may establish, where necessary, other special committees or 
bodies.172  
 
                                                          
 
170 Phinnemore, op. cit. note 20, p. 57.  
171 See Article 463(3) of the Ukraine AA, Article 226(6) of the Central America AA, etc. 
172 For instance, Association Council Decision 1/95 established a Customs Union Joint Committee (CUJC) to monitor the 
implementation of the customs union between the EU and Turkey. 
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The association committee, bringing representatives of the parties at senior official level, is generally 
regarded as the ‘workhorse’ of the association.173 It meets more frequently in comparison to the 
association council and assists the latter in the performance of its duties.  An association committee may 
create sub-committees to deal with the more technical aspects of the association.  
  
A third typical institution established under an association agreement is the association parliamentary 
committee, bringing together directly elected representatives of the parties. The function of these inter-
parliamentary bodies is always limited to a droit de regard. The association council may be asked to give 
information on the state and progress of the association and the inter-parliamentary body may make 
recommendations to the association council but is never granted any decision-making powers.  
 
Article 125  SAA  Serbia  Article 9 AA  Central America  Article 467 AA Ukraine  
 
A Stabilisation and Association 
Parliamentary Committee is 
hereby established. It shall be a 
forum for Members of the 
Parliament of Serbia and of the 
European Parliament to meet 
and exchange views. It shall 
meet at intervals that it shall 
itself determine. 
 
1. An Association Parliamentary 
Committee is hereby 
established. It shall consist of 
members of the European 
Parliament, on the one side, and 
of members of the Parlamento 
Centroamericano (PARLACEN), 
and in the case of Republics of 
the CA Party that are not 
members of PARLACEN, 
representatives 
designated by their respective 
National Congress, on the other 
side, who shall meet and 
exchange views. It shall 
determine the frequency of its 
meetings and shall be chaired 
by one of the two sides 
alternately. 
 
1. A Parliamentary Association 
Committee is hereby 
established. It shall be a forum 
for Members of the European 
Parliament and of the 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to 
meet and exchange views. It 
shall meet at intervals which it 
shall itself determine. 
Table 8: Inter-parliamentary bodies 
 
In the most recent association agreements, the institutional framework is further developed through the 
establishment of Civil Society Platforms,174 bringing together civil society representatives of both the EU 
and the associated third country. This institutional development is connected to the inclusion of new 
provisions devoted to civil society cooperation in order to ensure a better mutual knowledge and 
understanding between the parties.175 Civil society institutions are expected to play a role in the field of 
trade and sustainable development176 and are to be involved in social and cultural dialogues.177 This 
evolution illustrates once again how, over time, the scope of the established association has continuously 
expanded.  
 
Finally, it is noteworthy that the institutional framework established under the EEA agreement includes a 
number of unique features. For instance, it includes an EEA Consultative Committee made up of members 
                                                          
 
173 Phinnemore, op. cit. note 20, p. 57.  
174 See e.g.  Article 469 of the EU-Ukraine AA.   
175 Chapter 26, including Arts 443-445 of the EU-Ukraine AA. 
176 Article 299 of the EU-Ukraine AA. 
177 Article 421 and 438 of the EU-Ukraine AA. 
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of the EU’s Economic and Social Committee and its EFTA counterpart.178 Moreover, while formally not 
established on the basis of the EEA agreement, the creation of parallel structures such as the EFTA 
Surveillance Committee and the EFTA Court is of crucial importance for the effective functioning of the 
established association, which is based upon the objective of homogeneity (cf. supra).  
4.3. Dispute settlement 
 
All association agreements include a specific chapter on dispute settlement, typically involving different 
steps such as consultations within the framework of the association council (or committee) and the 
possible establishment of an arbitration panel. For the trade and trade-related aspects, specific provisions 
inspired by the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding may be included. The latter is not typical for 
association agreements but may also be found in most free trade agreements.  
 
Notwithstanding the existence of certain common features, there is no standard dispute settlement 
mechanism for association agreements. The precise provisions on dispute settlement develop over time 
and differ depending upon the type of association. For instance, in the case of the AA with Central 
America, the Association Committee is merely kept informed of the parties’ attempts to come to a 
settlement on any dispute they have. However, the Association Council (or Committee) is not formally 
involved in setting up ad hoc panels or on monitoring the implementation of panel rulings. Instead, the 
Association Council only adopts the rules of procedure of the panel and establishes the list of possible 
panelists.179 In contrast, the Stability and Association Councils (established pursuant to the SAAs 
concluded with the countries of the Western Balkans) are empowered to settle disputes between the 
parties and contain clauses on compulsory and binding arbitration with detailed rules on procedures and 
compliance.180 The more recent AAs with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are even more sophisticated in 
the sense that they also include provisions on conciliation (concerning urgent energy disputes) and 
mediation (on certain trade measures).181 As long as the dispute does not involve trade or trade-related 
measures, the Association Council is entitled to settle the dispute on the basis of a binding decision.   
 
It is noteworthy that the arbitration panels established under the association agreements are precluded 
from interpreting (internal) EU legislation.182 This is a direct result of the case law of the CJEU, which 
stressed on several occasions its exclusive jurisdiction in ensuring the uniform interpretation and 
application of EU law.183 As a result, the arbitration panels are bound to interpret the association 
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. The fact that 
a provision in an association agreement is ‘identical in substance’ to a provision of internal EU legislation 
is not decisive for its interpretation. It follows that disputes relating to the interpretation or application of 
the EU acquis, which may arise in the context of obligations relating to the process of legislative 
approximation, require the involvement of the CJEU. Such a specific mechanism is included in the AAs 
with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.184 The association agreement with Turkey and the EEA Agreement 
                                                          
 
178 See: http://www.efta.int/eea/eea-institutions/eea-consultative-committee.  
179 Arts 308-313 of the EU Central America AA.  
180 See e.g. Article 130 and Protocol No 7 of the EU-Serbia SAA. 
181 On the various mechanisms for dispute settlement, see also: A.  Rosas, ‘The EU and International Dispute Settlement’, Europe 
and the World: A Law Review, 2017, https://doi.org/10.14324/111.444.ewlj.2017.03. 
182 This, for instance, with so many words expressed in Article 13 of Protocol No. 7 on dispute settlement to the EU-Serbia SAA.  
183 See i.a. Opinion 1/91 re EEA, ECLI:EU:C:1991:490; Opinion 1/09 re Unified Patent Litigation System, ECLI:EU:C:2011:123; Opinion 
2/13 re ECHR, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. It is to be expected that this issue will also figure prominently in the Court’s Opinion 1/17 on 
CETA. See the Opinion of AG Bot in the Opinion procedure 1/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:72. However, Opinion 1/17 is concerned with an 
investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, not with a mechanism through which disputes between the parties are settled. In 
addition, under recent practice, and as a result of Opinion 2/15, the EU is concluding separate Investment Protection Agreements 
based on Article 207 TFEU. As a result, these agreements and the dispute settlement mechanisms fall outside the scope of the 
notion of association which is linked to Article 217 TFEU.  
184 See e.g. Article 322(2) of the association agreement with Ukraine. 
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also provide for the possible involvement of the CJEU, albeit under different modalities. 185  However, 
these clauses have so far never been used in practice.  
  
                                                          
 
185 See Article 25 (2) of the Ankara Agreement, involving the general possible for the Association Council to submit a dispute to 
the Court of Justice and Article 111 (3) of the EEA agreement, involving the possibility for the contracting parties to address the 
Court of Justice if a dispute has not been settled within three months after it has been brought before the EEA Joint Committee.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS   
 
Despite the rather vague description of the concept ‘association’ in Article 217 TFEU, the analysis of the 
EU’s treaty practice revealed a number of essential characteristics which, taken together, define the 
nature of association under EU law.  
 
First, the keyword for understanding the meaning of association in the EU legal order is flexibility. 
Association may take different forms. The precise scope and objectives of the established relationship 
depends upon the state of EU integration itself as well as the general (geo)political context. They may 
include tailor-made provisions targeting the specific challenges of a particular country or region. The 
established institutional framework allows for the further deepening of the relations in light of political 
evolutions. Accordingly, association agreements that are concluded without a membership perspective 
may develop into pre-accession instruments without a formal amendment of the agreements. 
Alternatively, they may provide a framework for integration without membership.    
 
Second, association agreements are comprehensive in nature. They bring together all areas of 
cooperation with a particular country (or group of countries) in one legal framework. An association 
agreement typically includes the establishment of a political dialogue, provisions on trade liberalisation 
and a wide range of areas for sector specific cooperation. Whereas other types of agreement may cover 
similar areas of cooperation, association agreements typically include more far-reaching commitments in 
terms of trade integration and legislative approximation.  
 
Third, association agreements establish a long-term institutional framework for cooperation. Most 
association agreements have been concluded for an unlimited period of time or have been updated on 
several occasions without affecting the core institutional structures. The existence of joint institutions 
with decision-making capacities allows for the further development of the association. Hence, association 
may be regarded as a dynamic process.     
 
Fourth, association agreements are of political significance. They are typically the most-ambitious and 
most far-reaching types of agreement concluded with third countries in a particular geographical area. 
As a result, association agreements introduce a certain level of differentiation in the EU’s relations with 
third countries. Accordingly, the prospect of association is often used as a policy instrument in order to 
upgrade the EU’s relations with certain partners. The establishment of an association signals the parties’ 
eagerness to entertain privileged legal, economic and political relations.  
 
Fifth, whereas the conclusion of an association agreement may lead to a form of ‘integration without 
membership’, there are certain limits to what is feasible under the association formula. In particular, the 
procedural and institutional rights of the associated countries are limited to decision-shaping and 
cannot involve any rights of representation or decision-making within the EU institutions.  
 
The identified characteristics make association a very suitable instrument for streamlining the EU’s 
relations with a variety of partners. It is, therefore, no coincidence that a further proliferation of new 
association agreements may be expected in the future. Reference can be made to the ongoing 
negotiations with Mercosur and the European micro-states Andorra, San Marino and Monaco. Article 217 
TFEU may also play a role in relation to the envisaged conclusion of an institutional framework agreement 
with Switzerland, even though the term ‘association’ has never been explicitly used in this context.  
 
Last but not least, the association formula may be used for defining the post-Brexit relations with the 
United Kingdom. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the political declaration setting out the framework 
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for the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom186 explicitly provides 
that the overarching institutional framework could take the form of an association agreement.   
 
Such a solution would definitely have a number of advantages. From a pragmatic point of view, it avoids 
potentially complex discussions regarding the choice of the correct legal basis for the new legal 
arrangement. In addition, the experience of the EU’s bilateral relations with Switzerland illustrates the 
importance of a well-designed institutional structure in order to guarantee legal certainty for citizens and 
businesses. Moreover, the establishment of joint bodies with decision-making powers allows for the 
dynamic development of the future relationship.  
 
The inherent flexibility of ‘association’ as a legal concept also means that the actual format of the new 
relations is not pre-defined. This may either be a comprehensive framework agreement, such as the 
association agreements with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, or a more focused agreement on market 
integration, such as the EEA agreement.  
 
Whether or not the term ‘association’ is mentioned in the title of the agreement may have a political 
significance but it is not very relevant from a legal point of view. As has been illustrated in this study, 
recourse to Article 217 TFEU is in essence a reflection of the EU’s internal competence to engage in a 
privileged relationship with third countries or international organisations. Since the Lisbon Treaty, the 
neighbourhood clause of Article 8 TEU specifies the Union’s constitutional mandate to establish special 
links with neighbouring countries without, however, affecting the traditional broad conception of 
association agreements under Article 217 TFEU. Hence, the practical legal added value of Article 8 TEU for 
the post-Brexit legal arrangement seems rather limited but it may help to clarify the background of a 
process leading to the development of a special relationship with a former member state.   
 
Finally, the role of the European Parliament in the process leading to the conclusion of association 
agreements may be further developed without amending the Treaties themselves. In particular, the 
Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA) between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 
Better Law-making may be be used to clarify the role of the Parliament with respect to issues such as 
access to the negotiation guidelines, decisions on provisional application and monitoring of the 
implementation and potential suspension of agreements.   
 
 
 
  
   
                                                          
 
186https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/political-declaration-setting-out-framework-future-relationship-between-
european-union-and-united-kingdom_en. 
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